Publication date: 1 July 2025.
Citation: Nadja Douglas, Míla O’Sullivan, Yuliya Yurchuk, Oleksii Vasyliuk, Tetiana Skrypchenko, Emancipatory Dimensions of In:Security – Strategies of Coping with War Challenges in Ukraine, KonKoop In:Security Report 1/2025.
Image: Bridge, Ukraine, Carpathians, 2017 (c) SLPix, pixabay, Pixabay Content License.
Acknowledgment: The editor cordially thanks Niklas Balbon for his review and constructive comments on the manuscript.
Introduction
CONTENTS
The collective trauma of Russian imperialism generated new momentum for post-colonial / feminist discourses not only in Ukraine.
Russia’s war of aggression has not only caused appalling atrocities and terrible destruction in Ukraine; it has also set back societal progress and security in various domains, including gender and social equality, historical justice and self-perception, societal cohesion and environmental protection. These dimensions of in:security have been widely overlooked in ongoing discourses with their emphasis on hard security issues.
And yet, the collective trauma of a resurgent Russian imperialism unites vulnerable groups and entities on the ground. Post-colonial and feminist discourses around this trauma have gained momentum since the beginning of the Russian full-scale military invasion, not only in Ukraine, but also elsewhere in the former Soviet space. This, ultimately, has consequences for the region and for European security in a larger sense.
Emancipation in general is a powerful tool of societal resilience in the face of authoritarianism. Thus, Ukraine’s emancipatory discourses and practices play a particularly crucial role in the resistance against the Russian invasion. The notion of ‘security as emancipation’ has long been at the centre of Critical Security Studies, which include a much wider range of potential threats, from economic and environmental issues to human rights and migration.[1] It offers a substantiated critique of traditional views of security and dominant state-centric assumptions, adopting instead a normative approach that links security to the goal of emancipation. ‘Security as emancipation’ is based on three ideas: 1) the focus on individuals as the ultimate referent of security; 2) the idea that security understandings and practices are political in their assumptions and implications; and 3) the normative commitment towards redressing insecurity and orientation towards transformation.[2] Kenneth Booth, one of the proponents of the emancipatory approach to security, has defined security as the absence of threats, and thus presented emancipation ‘as the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they freely choose to do’. He goes as far as stating that ‘security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security.’[3] Emancipation in this sense is a process rather than an end point, a direction rather than a destination.[4]
‘Security as emancipation’ overlaps with the human security agenda.
The ‘politics of security’, inherent to critical approaches to security, implies an awareness of the political assumptions that underlie understandings and practices of security. It, moreover, takes the processes and struggles through which they are reproduced and contested into consideration. Given its concerns with issues from the realm of sustainable development – human rights, poverty, safety from violence, etc. – ‘security as emancipation’ often overlaps with the human security agenda.[5] Human security builds on the idea that people’s rights are at least as important as those of states, with its core concern being the inextricable interrelationship between ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’.[6] Therefore, environmental security or the ecological dimension of security represents another challenge presented by war-induced damages. Environmental destruction, also labelled ‘ecocide’, and the consequences for global climate change have as yet remained below the radar of international perception. The environmental dimension thus feeds into the concept of human and societal security.
In a similar vein, this report seeks to focus on humans and communities for whom the present situation is a cause of great insecurity. In line with In:Security Report 1 and In:Security Report 2, which are a product of the research network KonKoop,[7] we again employ elements from vernacular security theories, with the concepts of ‘security as emancipation’ and ‘human security’ being inextricably linked. This does beg the question of where to stop when broadening the concept of security, since security ultimately relates to everything that is potentially under threat. Thus, we concentrate mainly on those issues that are product of what one would call from a socio-critical perspective a distorted power relation. The report thus emphasises the notion of ‘security from below’ and asks whether these neglected dimensions have the potential to bring about some sort of recovery or liberating effect for equally neglected people on the ground.
The present report summarises the results of the third In:Security Workshop held online on 16 October 2024 on ‘Emancipatory Dimensions of In:Security’ as part of KonKoop’s topic line ‘In:Security’. The topic line investigates how security is perceived, experienced and enacted by ordinary citizens and how ‘societal security’ in Europe has transformed in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The workshop was dedicated to the feminist, post-/de-colonial, ecological and societal dimensions of security and insecurity. Participants focused mainly on the Ukrainian case, but also drew comparisons to the situation in wider Eastern Europe. The purpose of the workshop was to pool expertise and enhance interdisciplinary exchange among the participants. This report is based on the exploratory research presented at the workshop by experts from Ukraine and the Czech Republic who then elaborated on the overarching question of how in:security has evolved and partly led to emancipatory/liberating attitudes and effects.
With regard to the choice of methods adopted in this report, we found it necessary to rethink what security means and whose voice is heard in the production of knowledge on security. Thus, our approach is based on a self-reflexive standpoint and positionality, conscious of the imbalances in the process of knowledge production. Regrettably, until today scholars from the region are marginalised in the production of knowledge on security. The epistemic imperialism of European partners that are – at least in academia – often still stuck in a system of knowledge production that is eurocentric and does not make it easier for Ukrainians to justify the defence of their homeland.
We explore the consequences of three years of war at the grassroots level and among the most vulnerable groups.
We strive not just to write about Ukraine, but also to let Ukrainian scholars voice and problematise their perspectives. To that end, we explore the social and environmental consequences of three years of war in Ukraine, attempting to provide insights into what is happening at the grassroots level and/or among the most vulnerable groups in Ukrainian society. We thus seek to draw a nuanced picture of their security and insecurity in times of war and violent oppression.
The first contribution by Míla O’Sullivan approaches the topic from a feminist perspective as embodied everyday insecurity. She sheds light on the multiple war-induced insecurities that, as part of Russia’s (ideological) warfare, reinforce the global normalisation of anti-gender radicalism. O’Sullivan shows how gender has become a central battlefield between an increasingly illiberal gender order in Russia, and the Ukrainian experience of an emancipatory and liberalising trend with regard to gender discourses. Ultimately, O’Sullivan pleads for a feminist re-thinking of deterrence beyond the nuclear umbrella through practices of societal defence and a whole-of-society approach to resilience.
The second contribution by Yuliya Yurchuk reflects on the momentum post-colonial and decolonial discourses have gained in Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian military invasion. These discussions, according to Yurchuk, take place at the level of official politics and at grassroots level, including efforts towards ‘personal’ decolonisation. While at the official level, decolonisation takes the form of nationalisation, she argues that at the grassroots level it is a means of liberation, self-empowerment and adaptation to radical insecurity. Yurchuk depicts decoloniality as an ongoing process of resistance and a condition for Ukraine’s victory in the war.
The third contribution by Ukrainian environmental activist Oleksii Vasyliuk summarises the presentation by himself and his colleague Eugene Simonov during the workshop. It delineates the effects of the war on human and environmental security in Ukraine. The compelling account of the damages wrought by the war on landscapes and ecosystems in Ukraine, with a particular focus on forests and lands, draws attention to the difficulties of post-war reconstruction. Despite the sobering situation, Vasyliuk discusses opportunities for the conversion of post-war ecosystems, for example in the Kakhovka Reservoir and Velikyi Luh.
The final contribution by Tetiana Skrypchenko emphasises the importance of the resilience prism in the context of societal responses to the war and the strengthening of societal cohesion in a society under occupation. She draws on recent survey data among the Ukrainian civilian population and military personnel. The results provide insights into the well-being of the most vulnerable social-demographic groups in Ukraine, which have had to cope with increased levels of stress and insecurity. Skrypchenko shows how the war prompted a remarkable surge in cohesion. In fact, she argues that cohesion and resilience are interrelated, as a resilient society is more likely to sustain cohesion, but weak cohesion can make it harder to stay resilient. She recommends that national approaches learn from community lessons and localised strategies in terms of recovery and resilience building. They have the potential to amplify and strengthen on the national level what works locally.
The concluding part illustrates the multifaceted nature of the security discourses in and beyond Ukraine and calls for a recognition of the emancipatory paths societal groups in Ukraine have chosen in resistance to Russian occupation.
Feminist Security and Defence in Russia’s War on Ukraine
Approaching security through a feminist lens can further the understanding of war-induced insecurities, envisioning emancipatory transformations.
Russia’s war on gender
Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and the full-scale war it launched in 2022 build on a long history of Russian and Soviet imperial violence in the region and elsewhere. As in its past war practices, Russia is waging a deeply gendered and racialised war that includes ethnic cleansing and systemic sexual and gender-based violence. In a wider sense it also includes the systemic oppression and military exploitation of indigenous populations from Central Asia and occupied areas of Ukraine, such as Crimean Tatars.[9] In Ukraine, multiple gendered insecurities have resulted from the war-induced disruption of millions of livelihoods and reproductive healthcare, the escalation of gender-based violence, as well as intersecting vulnerabilities, especially among female internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. The novelty of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that it is not only a gendered military conflict but also part of Russia’s war against gender and sexual equalities aimed at putting a halt to emancipatory tendencies in Ukraine.[10] The war was preceded by the consolidation of Russia’s anti-gender regime domestically and in the foreign policy of promoting the values of the Russian world (Russki mir), manifested in Orthodox fundamentalism, anti-gender radicalism and homophobia.[11] This ideological warfare underpins Russia’s imperialist strategy and informs decisions to subjugate Ukraine by killing, raping and torturing. Russia’s war crimes, crimes against humanity and disregard of international law thus reinforce the global normalisation of anti-democratic and anti-rights politics and contribute to the decline of the rule-based international order.Ukraine’s continuing efforts in the area of gender emancipation are both enabled and threatened by the war.
Self-defence as a decolonising feminist practice
Feminist approaches to self-defence, territorial defence and deterrence are vital in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Prior to 2022, they – like Europe’s East – were largely absent in Western-dominated feminist activism and scholarship on the WPS agenda, feminist foreign policy and NATO.[17] Since Russia launched its full-scale war, the EU, NATO and individual governments have provided military support to Ukraine. Ukrainian feminists have been vocal in their demands for arms deliveries to ensure their country’s survival, framing self-defence as a basic act of resistance.[18] Based on their real-life insecurities, they have exposed the need to decolonise feminist approaches to defence by establishing security guarantees and self-defence against military violence as fundamental feminist principles.[19] Ukrainian feminists have thus challenged some Western feminists who, from a position of privileged pacifism, continue to deny Ukraine agency and perpetuate Russian-centric narratives that reproduce the problematic dichotomy of the West/NATO vs Russia. Needless to say, an epistemic imperialism that relies on an abstract notion of pacifism exacerbates insecurities for the occupied societies, while also negating the role of women in the civilian liberation movement and the defence forces.[20] But the war has also prompted feminist solidarity with Ukraine and more pragmatic positions on the use of military force, which recognise that in an existential war, self-defence and security guarantees are a precondition for emancipatory transformation and can be compatible with feminist foreign policy approaches. This is the case with the German branch of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), which recognises Ukraine’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter in a statement from 2023, or the German government’s feminist foreign policy (FFP).[21] Bénédicte Santoire shows, however, that in practice, German and other FFPs have been siloed to the soft issue of humanitarian aid and development policies and their position on defence in relation to Ukraine remained unclear in 2022.[22] Later analysis by Chiara Pierobon suggests that since the German FFP was only developed in Spring 2022, the war has shaped the very essence of the policy and its approach to military assistance to Ukraine.[23] These developments speak to the broader lack of feminist discussions on defence and deterrence beyond pacifist and anti-militarist approaches.[24]A feminist perspective is sorely needed in discussions on a future security system to prevent wars.
Decolonial Memory Work as a Response to In:Security in the Context of Russia’s War against Ukraine
Yuliya Yurchuk is Associate Professor of History of Ideas at Södertörn University, Stockholm. She specialises in memory studies, the history of religion, and the study of nationalism in Eastern Europe. She is the author of the book “Reordering of Meaningful Worlds: Memory of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Post-Soviet Ukraine” (Acta 2014). She also translates Swedish literature into Ukrainian and is an author of the book “Sweden: a Model Kit (Vihola, 2022, in Ukrainian)”. Her research interests include memory, knowledge production, imperialism, decolonisation, and the securitisation of the past. > Homepage
Decommunisation and decolonisation: two discourses, one practice
When it comes to Ukraine’s efforts to deal with its past, the decade from 2014 to 2024 can roughly be divided into two periods: 1) the period from 2014 to 2021, which was dominated by the discourse of decommunisation;[32] and 2) the period from 2022 onwards, where the discourse of decolonisation prevailed. Both discursive tendencies were also reflected in the country’s legislation – the former in the ‘Law on decommunisation’ adopted in April 2015;[33] the latter in the ‘Law on condemnation and prohibition of propaganda of Russian imperial policy in Ukraine and decolonisation of place names’ introduced in 2023.[34] Nevertheless, both periods can be approached through the theoretical prism of decolonisation, understood as a project of liberation from the inherited epistemology of past regimes.With Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and military assault in the east of the country, Ukrainian society faced a threat not only to its existential security but also to its epistemological security, which rests on trust in one’s knowledge about oneself. The Russian invasion, which was accompanied by propaganda campaigns that revolved around history and historical memory, undermined the knowledge that Ukrainians had about themselves.
59% of the Ukrainian population in 2022 are in favour of renaming places named after Soviet and Russian figures.
This explains why the history of Russian oppression and Ukraine’s colonial status during the Soviet period, previously recognised only by intellectuals and a small part of Ukrainian society, has become central to public discussions of history since 2022. After the full-scale invasion, the re-evaluation of ‘inherited narratives’ intensified. More and more people started questioning the narrative of a ‘Ukrainian-Russian friendship’ and the presence of Russian cultural figures on Ukrainian territory. This is evidenced in surveys conducted before and after the invasion. For example, a survey conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiative Foundation in December 2022 found that about 59% of the Ukrainian population were in favour of renaming places named after Soviet and Russian. In 2020, only about 30% of Ukrainians supported such a renaming policy (see figure 1 below).
Individuals share their own stories of liberation from colonial epistemologies and inscribe them into the tapestry of collective identities in Ukraine.
Epistemological reconstitution as a project of personal liberation
The most interesting instances of epistemological reconstitution are the personal decolonisation projects that have been mushrooming in the media space since 2022. Individuals have begun to share their own stories of liberation from colonial epistemologies. Importantly, even if they start with individual stories, they inscribe them in the bigger tapestry of collective identities in Ukraine. The projects are hosted on social media platforms, YouTube, and on Ukraine’s public service broadcaster Suspilne. But it should be emphasised that the topic of decolonisation first became popular thanks to projects not connected to the mainstream media. The podcasts created by Mariam Naiem and Valentyna Sotnykova are a good example. In 2023, they created the decolonisation podcast ‘De my?’ (‘Where are we?’). This podcast was part of the Svidomi platform – a community-driven initiative dedicated to distributing news and analytics on social media. A year later, Naiem and Sotnykova were invited to host their new project, a podcast called ‘Dekolonizatorky’ (literally: female decolonisers) on Suspilne. In this way, a private initiative born of genuine personal interest grew into a much bigger project supported by the public broadcaster. There are numerous examples of similar projects, and a detailed analysis of them would be an interesting endeavour in itself. Yet here I will focus on what they have in common.
Decolonisation becomes a powerful tool for personal transformation and the integration of a difficult reality into new life narratives.
The hosts of these projects invite guests who share their personal decolonisation stories and reflect on Ukrainian history and the re-evaluation of historical narratives. Moreover, both hosts and guests continually reflect on language, geopolitics and popular culture. In the process, they produce new narratives about themselves and Ukraine. The projects are an example of identity transformation under the dramatic circumstances of war. Decolonisation thus becomes a powerful tool for personal transformation and the integration of a difficult reality into new life narratives.
Photo 1: Mariam Naiem and Valentyna Sotnykova in their podcast ‘Dekolonizatorky’
Source: Podcast cover picture ‘Dekolonizatorky’ on Apple Podcasts, Link.
Decolonisation and the formation of new identities
Switching languages is a common thread that runs through many reconstituted narratives in the projects mentioned above. People often describe how they switched from Russian to Ukrainian in the process of forming a new identity in response to insecurity. There is also an emphasis on the ownership of history. ‘Inherited epistemologies’ (mainly from the Soviet period) are rejected and a new epistemology is constructed around previously forbidden episodes of history like the Holodomor of 1932–1933 and other instances of Stalinist terror.[36] Last but not least, decolonisation is perceived as a precondition of Ukraine’s victory in the war. Here, a tendency towards the securitisation of (new) identities becomes apparent, where certain types of identity are framed as a prerequisite for security. Liberated epistemologies can play a powerful role in transforming identities and overcoming colonial traumas. The reconstituted narratives individuals tell about themselves and the country as a whole help them to (re)envision the future without ‘inherited epistemologies’ that are increasingly perceived as oppressive. These narratives are also a tool of self-empowerment that help people cope with existential anxieties in the face of insecurity and the national identity at stake. Trauma expert Judith Herman stresses that transformed identities come about as a result of healing. In order to recover and imagine potential futures, it is essential that subjects (re)integrate different parts of the self, based on the self-knowledge that allows such re-integration.[37] The people involved in personal decolonisation projects mention dealing with feelings of shame, (self)-anger, and inferiority before they started caring about themselves from a position of love and understanding that the decolonisation framework provided. In the radical insecurity of war, people come to re-evaluate their attitudes to themselves and try to show themselves more love. At the same time, it should be added that the decolonising agenda can be hijacked by partisan and state actors. This can potentially lead to the cementing of an official memory politics that excludes the histories of certain groups. For now, it is too early to see the consequences of administered or state-sponsored decolonisation policies. As this paper shows, the most interesting discussions on decolonisation touch upon questions of coming to terms with the past on a personal level. These discussions show how decolonisation can restore identities threatened by insecurities in the present.Understanding the Environmental Consequences of the War in Ukraine
The entire occupied territory is currently mined – it could take up to 750 years to demine the area.
Destruction of nature through explosions and military equipment
During military combat, most changes happen on the surface. Explosions, artillery shelling, and the movement of heavy equipment leave traces on the landscape, destroying not only vegetation cover but also the soil structure and the wider ecosystem of the affected territories. Like a broken mechanism, natural processes come to a halt. Here it is worth considering not only the effects on areas at the epicentre of the fighting, but also secondary contamination of the soil, air and water in more far-removed regions. After an explosion, contaminated particles can travel long distances, sometimes even polluting the soil in other countries.[39] Destroyed farmland, forests and parks and scorched earth are just some of the things warfare leaves in its wake. Damaged soil is no longer fertile and thus of no use for farming. It could take decades and in some cases even longer for these territories to recover.[40] It is impossible to say how many generations of Ukrainians will have to wait before they can return to the damaged lands.Forest fires: Another site of destruction
The forest fires that accompany military combat are another serious consequence for the environment (see map 1 below). They cause enormous damage to ecosystems, destroying flora and fauna as well as the natural resources that play an important role in maintaining the ecological balance. Since it’s impossible to extinguish fires during the fighting and on mined territory, they continue for as long as the landscape allows, in other words until everything has burned down. Fires resulting from shelling, explosions or destroyed military equipment destroy vast areas of forest that will take over a lifetime to regenerate. The war unfolded in Ukraine’s steppe zone, where forests are not typical. All the forests that existed here before the war were artificial plantations created to improve people’s lives in the harsh climatic conditions of the south. But these forests are gone now. At least 100,000 hectares of forest burned down around major cities alone.[41]Fires resulting from shelling and explosions destroy vast areas of forest that will take over a lifetime to regenerate.
The Kakhovka reservoir: Environmental impacts and restoration
Another ecological disaster caused by the war was the detonation of the Kakhovka hydroelectric dam by Russian troops on 6 June 2023. This led to a sharp drop in the level of water in the Kakhovka reservoir, posing a serious threat to the ecosystem of the reservoir and surrounding areas. The destruction of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric dam is the largest ecological catastrophe of the war to date.[43] It radically changed the ecosystems that had developed around the reservoir. The changes were felt in three key areas: the former reservoir bed, flooded areas, and the north-western part of the Black Sea. In the dried areas of the seabed, bottom organisms disappeared and isolated water bodies were formed, which became traps for fish. The mass death of aquatic organisms caused secondary water pollution. In the flooding zone there was a massive loss of living organisms, including rare and internationally protected species. Protected natural areas were affected as a result. More than 80% of the flooded land was under national and international protection. The north-western part of the Black Sea was affected by eutrophication, the spread of blue-green algae and changes in salinity.It is possible to learn from the experience of nature restoration at the Kakhovka reservoir when planning the restoration of ecosystems after similar events.
Despite the significant negative impact, the catastrophe also created the conditions for the spontaneous restoration of natural ecosystems, in particular, the renewal of the Dnieper flow over a 250-kilometre stretch. Populations of passable fish species are being restored and new spawning grounds are forming there. Native plants such as willows and poplars have begun to sprout in the drained areas, and floodplains are being restored with their characteristic biodiversity. The high climatic stability of the floodplain forests of Velikiy Lug corresponds to the natural state of the Dnieper River floodplain. It is possible to learn from the experience of nature restoration at the site of the Kakhovka reservoir when studying the consequences of similar events and planning the restoration of ecosystems.
A full assessment of the ecological consequences of this terrorist act is, however, impossible given the inaccessibility of the area and the absence of precise, verifiable qualitative data. Large-scale research can only take place after demining. In the meantime, some information may be lost due to natural ecosystem recovery. Looking ahead, it seems likely that researchers will be able to capture the extent of ecosystem restoration rather than the scale of the destruction that happened in 2023. The change in the status of rare species on the IUCN Red List as a result of the tragedy opens up new possibilities for calculating the damage. The analysis of soil samples and a refinement of impact assessments are also expected to play an important role in quantifying the damage, not least in monetary terms.
Any decision on the future of the territory of the former Kakhovka reservoir must be informed by an assessment of the consequences of the terrorist attack. The fact that it is contaminated by toxic substances rules out the possibility of agricultural use. And the natural regeneration of forest vegetation calls into question the feasibility of creating a new reservoir, as this would require the destruction of the largest forest area in Ukraine’s steppe zone.
Ukraine is faced with the challenge of developing scenarios for the post-war reconstruction of the southern region, including the question of whether to build a reservoir or find alternative solutions. Reconstruction tends to be seen mainly in terms of the revitalisation of infrastructure and economy. Yet quality of life in the region depends on healthy natural ecosystems: water resources, air quality, fertile soils, the climate and opportunities for recreation.
Is a spontaneous restoration of nature possible?
Nature has the capacity to restore itself, and after the war the recovery process will depend on many different factors. Restoring ecosystems, especially large and complex ones like reservoirs or forested areas, takes time and effort. Spontaneous regeneration on abandoned farmland and in destroyed settlements leads to the emergence of new, invasive species, and the presence of such alien plants and animals makes it more difficult to restore the ecological balance.
The war in Ukraine leaves deep scars on nature, which will be felt not only in the near future, but for centuries to come.
The war in Ukraine is leaving deep scars on nature (such as changes in surface temperatures that impact the local ecosystems, see map 2 above). These scars will be felt not only in the near future, but for centuries to come. Once the active phase of fighting is over, there is a need to think seriously about restoring ecosystems and biodiversity. The Kakhovska reservoir is a prime example of how war can change nature and how important it is to act quickly to minimise these changes.
In this context, ecological factors are currently not only a question of security or insecurity in Ukraine, but a question of quality of life. Under martial law in Ukraine, however, almost all environmental restrictions and rules for the environmental assessment procedures have been lifted, which means that major recovery processes will be deferred until the post-war period.
Fostering Resilience and Social Cohesion under Occupation
In times of war, resilience ensures the continuity of everyday life, supports collective morale and recovery efforts.
Levels of resilience and vulnerable groups
Resilience is crucial in wartime. Despite the sometimes dire security, energy, economic, and humanitarian situations in which they find themselves, Ukrainians have been remarkably resilient during the war. Studies such as Rating Lab’s monitoring surveys[44] demonstrate sustained high levels of both physical and psychological resilience.[45] This has been an important factor in sustaining a high level of civil activity, resource mobilisation, support for the military and social assistance and accelerating the restoration of housing and other infrastructure at the local level. At the same time, levels of resilience vary across different groups. For example, resilience is lower among the less well-off population and women (see figure 3). Low resilience in these groups can lead to more stress, long-term psychological problems, less social involvement, and higher risks to their financial well-being and health, thus compounding inequalities.Levels of resilience vary across different groups and are lower e.g. among the less affluent population and women.
It is also important to understand that a certain level of resilience does not mean easy adaptation to wartime conditions. Apart from the aforementioned groups, other vulnerable categories of people include family members of defenders (especially their wives) and young people, who experience higher levels of stress. The problem of low resilience requires more attention and new initiatives, since a large segment of the population, including those who need support, do not use existing psychological services because of a stigma around seeking psychological help in Ukraine.[46]
A high level of resilience helps individuals and communities withstand crises, but social cohesion is just as important for determining the strength of collective responses over time. Indeed the two factors are interrelated, as a resilient society is more likely to sustain cohesion, but weak cohesion can make it harder to stay resilient (at the very least, based on the experience and observations of residents of de-occupied cities and towns in Ukraine).
A resilient society is more likely to sustain cohesion, but weak cohesion can make it harder to stay resilient.
Dynamics of social cohesion and factors of division
Before the war, social cohesion in Ukraine was weakened by regional diversity, linguistic differences, and conflicting narratives on the direction the country should take. For example, before the war, there was no societal consensus on NATO membership or clear position vis-à-vis Russia. The war has changed that. It prompted a remarkable surge in cohesion, as Ukrainians were united by a shared sense of purpose and the existential threat posed by Russian aggression. Regional differences in social cohesion with ideological markers have largely diminished during the war. At the same time, factors of division, such as political polarisation and socio-economic disparities, have been exacerbated in certain contexts. For example, economic inequality has deepened as frontline regions experience greater devastation compared to relatively safe areas.
The dynamics of social resilience and cohesion have changed over the course of the war. The start of the war marked a peak of unity, mutual assistance, and support for the armed forces. Over time, however, the degree of societal unity has lessened. A study published by Rating Group at the end of 2023 showed that respondents believed Ukrainians were more united in 2022 (87%) than in 2023 (64%).[47]
Key factors in social division include:
– Staying or leaving Ukraine: Ukrainians who stayed after Russia’s full-scale invasion are ambivalent about those who left. They are generally warmer towards women with children but significantly colder towards other categories of refugees (see figure 4).[48]
– Participating or not participating in the war effort or avoiding mobilisation;
– Political differences, including positive/negative attitudes towards the government;
– A sense of injustice stemming from the uneven impact of war on different regions;
– Socio-economic inequalities – criticism of wealthier people who spend more on leisure pursuits, luxuries, and travel has become more pronounced during the war.
Figure 4: Attitude towards different social groups and categories
Source: Rating Group Research, Link.
When developing social consolidation strategies, the government must address these divisions. In a survey conducted in 2023, respondents also identified political differences and mutual accusations as the top two factors that divide society (see figure 5).
Paths to maintaining social resilience at national and local levels
In another 2023 survey, victories of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, reconstruction, and mutual assistance were seen by respondents as the most unifying factors for Ukrainians.[49] For others, economic growth, language, and successes in the EU accession process also helped to bind Ukrainian society. Significant national events, such as military victories, boost collective morale and encourage people to volunteer and make donations. However, these moments are short-lived. Similarly, progress in the EU or NATO accession processes, although inspiring, is often halting and unpredictable. It is also beyond the control of national government and local communities. This is why stable national strategies are needed to build unity around what does not depend on European or other partners but lies solely within the responsibility of the Ukrainian government.Significant national events, such as military victories, boost collective morale, but are short-lived.
Future reintegration efforts should consider the gap between those who experienced occupation and rebuilding and those who did not.
There is a difference between national and local strategies in the process of recovery and resilience building. National policies provide overarching direction, set general priorities, allocate resources, and establish an institutional framework. Local communities work in a more direct and flexible way, reacting to urgent problems, using informal connections, and driving grassroots action. While national strategies (developed by central government) are often more structured, local initiatives (developed by local authorities) are often the first to act in a crisis, using their specific knowledge and resources to address challenges in real time. This difference highlights the need for a more systematic approach that integrates both levels, ensuring that national policies amplify and strengthen what works locally. Successful local efforts, like community rebuilding projects and support networks, could be scaled up by encouraging cooperation between local leaders, NGOs, and the government. Creating ways to share knowledge and give local innovators the support they need can help spread these solutions to other parts of Ukraine.
A more systematic approach is needed that integrates both levels, ensuring that national policies amplify and strengthen what works locally.
In sum, efforts to build resilience are not just about survival but also about resistance and empowerment. Resilience helps Ukraine stand up to Russian control, both on the frontline and in society. Community resilience, in particular, plays an important role in establishing emancipatory practices, fostering a sense of agency and security, and rejecting imposed narratives. By focusing on both national unity and local support, Ukraine can make sure that resilience works as a bulwark against outside threats and insecurity.
Conclusion
Ukraine has become not only a symbol of resistance but also of the vast potential of emancipation.
Today, three years into the war and with no immediate prospect for a just and sustainable peace in sight, the Ukrainian people have shown remarkable capacity to withstand, adapt and respond to the shocks, challenges and situations of insecurity that Russia’s war has presented them with. In the context of international negotiations or discussions, the calculated optimism and steadfastness of Ukrainian representatives leave observers baffled. Ukraine has become a symbol not only of resistance but also of the vast potential of emancipation. The national emancipation effort is made up of a myriad of human components, recalling what critical security scholars have always emphasised: The study of security and insecurity is ultimately about the experiences of ‘real people’ in ‘real places’.[51]
All the contributions in this report have stressed different facets or dimensions of security and insecurity as well as emancipatory paths to deal with the challenges presented by the war. An important takeaway from the workshop, now confirmed in the report, was that strategies for tackling these challenges differ markedly at the grassroots and the state/institutional level. Míla O’Sullivan, for example, observed that crisis preparedness and civilian defence in terms of a whole-of-society approach to resilience are gendered processes, performed in women’s active civilian and military resistance on the ground. She reveals many ambivalences regarding the inclusion of gender aspects in security thinking, decision-making and ultimately recovery, citing, for example, the gender-oblivious recovery plan imposed on Ukraine by the West. Indeed, as the author has shown earlier, even Ukraine’s own recovery plans have turned out to be blind to, for example, social reproduction. Here, they ignore the demands of Ukrainian feminists to prioritise social infrastructure, including schools, hospitals and nurseries.[52] Besides delineating the Ukrainian decolonial discourse as an identity-building endeavour and act of self-empowerment, Yuliya Yurchuk also points to the risk of the decolonising agenda being hijacked by partisan state actors, which she warns could potentially lead to a cementing of an official memory politics that excludes the histories of certain social groups. In the case of the environmental consequences of the war, it is mostly local actors who ultimately have to cope with the long-term impacts, document the damages and seek to mitigate them. Finally, Tetiana Skrypchenko’s study sheds light on the differences between national and local strategies in the process of recovery and resilience building: National policies provide direction, set priorities, allocate resources and create an institutional framework, whereas local communities work in a more direct and flexible way, reacting to urgent problems, relying on informal connections, and driving grassroots actions.
Aside from the interaction between local and institutional levels, there are other dimensions to the emancipatory responses to the diverse challenges of this war. The second is the aspect of social identity, be it women’s active resistance entailing a re-definition of gender roles or how Ukrainian citizens face down a threat not only to their existential but also to their epistemological security, which is based on trust in one’s knowledge about oneself. Then there is the surge of patriotism and social cohesion prompted by the war and the strong motivation that generates to rebuild the community. The third dimension is the recovery mind-set common to all emancipatory responses, which ultimately aim for a transformation from a state of insecurity to a state of security and self-awareness.
‘Security as emancipation’ and the human security agenda can serve as a prism only insofar as there is no need for further differentiation of the societal groups concerned. As Skrypchenko’s contribution shows, the most vulnerable groups often fall through the cracks when tales of resilience are supposed to show another picture.
Security in and around Ukraine is more multifaceted than realist discourses around deterrence and rearmament suggest.
In conclusion, this report seeks to illustrate that security in and around Ukraine is more multifaceted than realist discourses around deterrence and rearmament might suggest. It sheds light on the most pressing war-induced societal and environmental problems. It also tries to convey how under conditions of occupation local initiatives and state/institutional approaches complement and sometimes contradict each other. The report finally pleads for more recognition of the emancipatory paths various societal groups in Ukraine have embarked upon to withstand Russian occupation, ideological and material violence, and historical injustice.
References
[1] Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, ‘Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,’ Mershon International Studies Review 40 (1996): 229-254.
[2] Soumita Basu and João Nunes, ‘Security as emancipation,’ In: Critical Approaches to Security An introduction to theories and methods, edited by Laura Shepherd (Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2013).
[3] Kenneth Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, 17(4), 1991: 313-326.
[4] Karen Fierke, Critical Theory, Security and Emancipation. International Studies Association Compendium Project, 2009.
[5] Soumita Basu and João Nunes, ‘Security as emancipation,’ In: Critical Approaches to Security An introduction to theories and methods, edited by Laura Shepherd (Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2013).
[6] Caroline Thomas, ‘What is Human Security? A Bridge between the interconnected challenges confronting the world,’ Security Dialogue 35(3), 2004: 353-354., Karen Fierke, Critical Theory, Security and Emancipation. International Studies Association Compendium Project, 2009.
[7] The research network “Cooperation and Conflict in Eastern Europe: The Consequences of the Reconfiguration of Political, Economic, and Social Spaces since the End of the Cold War” (KonKoop) comprises six academic institutions from across Germany and is associated with many partners worldwide. It examines various conflict constellations and dynamics of cooperation in Eastern Europe, Southeast Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Our aim is to understand and explain interactions and integrate the expertise available in Germany.
[8] Soumita Basu, ‘Emancipatory Potential in Feminist Security Studies’, International Studies Perspectives 14, (2013): 455–458.
[9] Tereza Hendl, Olga Burlyuk, Míla O’Sullivan, and Aizada Arystanbek, ‘(En)Countering Epistemic Imperialism: A Critique of ‘Westsplaining’ and Coloniality in Dominant Debates on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 45:2, (2024): 171–209.
[10] Kratochvíl, Petr and Míla O’Sullivan, ‘A War Like No Other: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine as a War on Gender Order’, European Security, Vol. 32:3, (2023): 347-366.
[11] Kratochvíl, Petr and Míla O’Sullivan, ‘A War Like No Other: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine as a War on Gender Order’, European Security, Vol. 32:3, (2023): 347-366.
[12] Kratochvíl, Petr and Míla O’Sullivan, ‘A War Like No Other: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine as a War on Gender Order’, European Security, Vol. 32:3, (2023): 347-366.
[13] Ivan Shmatko and Dafna Rachok, ‘Parallel Identities: LGBTQ+ Soldiers and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine’, in: Feminist Perspectives on Russia’s War on Ukraine: Hear Our Voices, edited by Maryna Shevtsova (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2024).
[14] Míla O’Sullivan, ‘Women, Peace and Security as Deterrence? NATO and Russia’s War against Ukraine’, International Affairs, Vol. 100:2, (2024): 549–568.
[15] Galyna Kotliuk; ‚The Hidden Front of Russia’s War: Addressing Gender-Based Violence in Ukraine’, Policy Brief, GPPI, 26 June 2024.
[16] Nataliia Lomonosova and Anna Provan, Build Back Better for Everyone: A Feminist Perspective on Reconstruction and Recovery of Ukraine, Policy Paper, Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, 2024.
[17] Kateřina Krulišová and Míla O’Sullivan, ‘Feminist Security Studies in Europe: Beyond Western Academics’ Club’, in: Feminist IR in Europe: Knowledge Production in Academic Institutions, edited by Maria Stern and Ann Towns (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).
[18] Feminist Initiative Group, ‘The Right to Resist: A Feminist Manifesto’, 7 July 2022, Commons/Spilne: https://commons.com.ua/en/right-resist-feminist-manifesto/.
[19] Feminist Initiative Group, ‘The Right to Resist: A Feminist Manifesto’, 7 July 2022, Commons/Spilne: https://commons.com.ua/en/right-resist-feminist-manifesto/.
[20] Tereza Hendl, Olga Burlyuk, Míla O’Sullivan, and Aizada Arystanbek, ‘(En)Countering Epistemic Imperialism: A Critique of ‘Westsplaining’ and Coloniality in Dominant Debates on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 45:2, (2024): 171–209.
[21] Serafine Dinkel, Dana Schirwon and Leonie Stamm, Defining Feminist Foreign Policy in Germany’s National Security Strategy, DGAP Policy Brief, July 2022: https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/defining-feminist-foreign-policy-germanys-national-security-strategy.
[22] Bénédicte Santoire, ‘Loud and Uncomfortable Silences: Ukraine and the Challenges, Limits, and Possibilities of Western Feminist Foreign Policies’, in: Feminist Perspectives on Russia’s War on Ukraine: Hear Our Voices, edited by Maryna Shevtsova (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2024).
[23] Chiara Pierobon, ‘Shaping German Feminist Foreign Policy in Times of Conflict in Ukraine’, in: Polarization, Shifting Borders and Liquid Governance, edited by Anja Mihr and Chiara Pierobon (Springer, 2024): https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-44584-2_17.
[24] Míla O’Sullivan, ‘Women, Peace and Security as Deterrence? NATO and Russia’s War against Ukraine’, International Affairs, Vol. 100:2, (2024): 549–568.
[25] Míla O’Sullivan, ‘Women, Peace and Security as Deterrence? NATO and Russia’s War against Ukraine’, International Affairs, Vol. 100:2, (2024): 549–568.
[26] NATO considers resilience to be the first line of deterrence, as it is an important aspect of deterrence by denial. See https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/topics_133127.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[27] Míla O’Sullivan, ‘Women, Peace and Security as Deterrence? NATO and Russia’s War against Ukraine’, International Affairs, Vol. 100:2, (2024): 549–568.
[28] See Finland’s WPS NAP 2023–2027: https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/165144.
[29] Míla O’Sullivan, ‘Women, Peace and Security as Deterrence? NATO and Russia’s War against Ukraine’, International Affairs, Vol. 100:2, (2024): 549–568.
[30] Yuliya Yurchuk and Kateryna Zarembo, ‘The Human Face of Ukrainian Resilience’, in: A World Order in Transformation?, edited by Ninna Mörner (Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University, 2024).
[31] Nationalisation of historical and mnemonic narratives usually means presentation of history as a nation- building process, in the Ukrainian case closely linked to the process of state-building.
[32] Decommunisation describes the process of eliminating former communist elements, officials and symbols from public life.
[33] This was a package of four different laws commemorating the victory over Nazism in the Second World War, condemning the communist and National-Socialist totalitarian regimes, remembering the fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the twentieth century, and on granting access to the archives of repressive institutions under the communist totalitarian regime.
[34] See text of the law (latest edition 03 May 2023).
[35] Anibal Quijano, ‘Coloniality and modernity/Rationality’, Cultural Studies, 21:2-3 (2007), 168–178.
[36] See, for instance, the episode on Holodomor with Daria Mattigly, a recognised expert on the period: https://podcasts.apple.com/se/podcast/decolonisation/id1771071510?i=1000680725670.
[37] Judith Herman, Truth and Repair: How Trauma Survivors Envision Justice. Basic Books, 2023.
[38] Oleksiy Vasyliuk, Danger! Mines! The terrible environmental and human cost of Ukraine’s minefields, Ukraine War Environmental Consequences Work Group, 18 November 2024, https://uwecworkgroup.info/danger-mines-the-terrible-environmental-and-human-cost-of-ukraines-minefields/.
[39] Maksym Solokha et al. ‘Soil Degradation and Contamination Due to Armed Conflict in Ukraine’, Land 13, no. 10 (2024): 1614. https://doi.org/10.3390/land13101614.
[40] Darya Tsymbalyuk, Ecocide in Ukraine: The Environmental Cost of Russia’s War. John Wiley & Sons, 2025.
[41] Oleksiy Vasyliuk and Viktor Parchomenko, Flames of war: How Ukraine lost over 1,000 square kilometers of forest, 2024 UWEC work group, Issue 21, December 2024.
[42] Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Unique plants in the south of Ukraine may become extinct because of the war, 23 December 2022, https://uacrisis.org/en/cherez-vijnu-unikalni-roslyny-na-pivdni-ukrayiny-mozhut-znyknuty-nazavzhdy.
[43] Institute for Human Sciences (IWM Vienna), Documenting Environmental Changes Caused by the Destruction of the Kakhovka Reservoir, Blog ‘Documenting Ukraine’, 31 January 2025, https://www.iwm.at/documenting-ukraine/blog/environmental-changes-kakhovka-reservoir.
[44] Rating Lab research, Dynamics of Psycho-emotional States of the Population, December 2023, https://ratinglab.org/en/research/Dinamika_psihoemocijnih_staniv_naselennya.
[45] The Resilience Index scale contains 11 dimensions and consists of 2 indicators: psychological resilience includes such measures as interest in life, ability to make decisions, attitude to the past and future, sense of self-worth etc., while physical resilience takes into account maintaining physical health, quality of sleep, nutrition, feeling of fatigue, etc.
[46] Rating Lab and AUK research, Barriers and Stereotypes: Why People Avoid Psychological Help, September 2024, https://ratinglab.org/en/research/baryeri-ta-stereotipi-chomu-lyudi-unikayut-psihologichnoyi-dopomogi.
[47] Rating Group research, 25th wave of the national survey ‘Ukraine Under Conditions of War’, December 2023, http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/dvadcyat_piyate_zagalnonacionalne_opituvanny_spriynyattazagroz_na_zimu_2023-2024.html.
[48] Rating Group research, Sociological Research for Independence Day: Perception of Patriotism and the Future of Ukraine, August 2023, http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/soc_olog_chne_dosl_dzhennya_do_dnya_nezalezhno_uyavlennya_pro_patr_otizm_ta_maybutn_ukra_ni_16-20_se.html.
[49] Rating Group research, Ukraine’s Resilience Formula: The Essential Components During War and Post-War, June 2023, http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/ukraine_s_resilience_formula_the_essential_components_during_war_and_post-war_6_11_june_2023.html.
[50] Rating Group and TDC research, Promoting Unity: Recommendations for the Development of a National Reintegration Strategy Based on the Experience of the Kharkiv and Kherson Regions, June 2024, https://tdcenter.org/2024/07/02/promoting-unity-recommendations-for-the-development-of-a-national-reintegration-strategy-based-on-the-experience-of-the-kharkiv-and-kherson-regions/.
[51] Soumita Basu and João Nunes, ‘Security as emancipation,’ In: Critical Approaches to Security An introduction to theories and methods, edited by Laura Shepherd (Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2013).
[52] Kratochvíl, Petr and Míla O’Sullivan, ‘A War Like No Other: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine as a War on Gender Order’, European Security, Vol. 32:3, (2023): 347-366).
