Publication date: November 29th 2025.
Citation: Nadja Douglas, Simon Weiß, Yevgeniya Gaber, Denis Cenusa, Magda Jakubowska, Anna Kuczyńska, Alexandra Dienes: Perspectives on European Security: From Below and In Between, KonKoop, In:Security Report 2/2025.
Image: Barbed, Wire, Security (c) ds_30, Pixabay.
Introduction
CONTENTS
Europe’s security order is dysfunctional. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally changed regional and local security dynamics. The continent is afflicted with a fragmented notion of order and overlapping regional economic and security formats.
At the same time, increasing inter- and intra-societal tensions as well as individual fears are contributing to perceptions of growing societal and personal insecurity. Perceptions of security and insecurity on the ground have been nationalised and compartmentalised. Instead of co-operation and dialogue, rearmament, deterrence and border closures are back on the agenda. The consequences of the so-called Zeitenwende and related policy changes are dire, in particular for societal and human security and evolving security needs and expectations at the local/regional levels.
The present period should be used to ponder ways of restructuring European security.
The debate on the extent to which security guarantees for Ukraine (and other non-NATO/non-aligned states) should be provided and which form they should take looms large. Despite the unlikelihood of an imminent and lasting armistice between Ukraine and Russia, the present period should and could be used to ponder ways of restructuring European security. From a European perspective, a new security constellation should not only fulfil geopolitical exigencies and the agenda of powerful stakeholders, but also meet the needs and expectations of the European peoples and those in-between states that are torn between the European Union/NATO and Russia. Indeed, the interests of the most war-affected societies (i.e. first and foremost Ukraine, but also Moldova, Belarus, countries in the South Caucasus and the frontline states in northeastern Europe) should be given priority and even more importantly a voice. However, attention should also be paid to the extent to which their interests align with or diverge from other Western allies. To stabilise and improve European security in the medium to long term, and to restructure the current dysfunctional order, a viable regional setting, i.e. an alternative arrangement that will provide these states with a security-political orientation, could be an option. In any new arrangements the role of Russia ought to be as precisely defined as the role of NATO and the EU. For the time being, there can be no order with Russia, but it should not be explicitly defined as being directed against Russia.
The ZOiS KonKoop workshop ‘Vision(s) of Post-war European Security’ held on 22 January 2025 emphasised the regional and local levels, taking security perceptions and visions ‘from below’ and ‘in between’ into account. It was an endeavour to brainstorm about different perspectives on European security by scrutinising how decisions on the European/geopolitical level resonate on the ground. The debate departed from the premise that the unresolved regional order has for long been a decisive factor in the dispute around European security.
In the workshop and this follow-up report, we approach the topic through the prism of ontological security. Ontological security is a concept originally rooted in psychology and sociology. It refers to the ‘sense of self’ or ‘security as being’.[1] This implies confidence in the constancy of one’s being and belonging, the need for a stable identity, and a feeling of predictability in one’s relationships with the world. The concept is used to illustrate how certain anxieties and fears can have an influence on the overall perception of security. It has recently become established in International Relations (IR) literature as a way of describing the security perceptions of states and the sense of stability, predictability and identity they need to function effectively and maintain a sense of agency.
According to Hugo von Essen and August Danielson, the underlying assumption here is that states act as though they were subjects that feel emotions and consequently react to them.[2] The general cause of ontological insecurity can be shame and/or discontinuity. The source of ontological insecurity can in turn be inadequacy in one’s own eyes or distrust of the self and others/outside world or a sense of insufficient compliance with norms. Sources of ontological insecurity are hence reflexive (intrinsic), relational and/or systemic (extrinsic).[3] In the context of European security, ontological security helps to explain why certain narratives or events can trigger feelings of fear and anxiety, potentially leading to changes in discourses, policies or even security crises.
The external threat emanating from Russia has eroded the sense of certainty and predictability crucial for feeling safe.
Prerequisites and Tools for Facilitating a New Peace and Security Order in Europe
Preconditions and instruments of a new security architecture
There are several preconditions for a sustainable European peace order. The war in Ukraine must end. It must end through a negotiated agreement that offers Ukraine credible sovereignty guarantees, while reassuring Russia that peaceful coexistence within a revised European security order remains possible. Second, trust must be rebuilt through strategic restraint, dialogue transparency and confidence building. The 1967 ‘Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance’, also known as the Harmel Report, continues to be a model document for reasserting NATO’s basic principles and effectively introducing the notion of deterrence and détente, which means dialogue.[7] The OSCE’s Vienna Document and earlier Confidence and Security Building Measured (CSBMs) must be revitalised. Third, it is essential to reaffirm principles such as non-aggression, sovereign equality, and indivisible security, as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, in light of twenty-first-century geopolitical realities. Arms control must evolve. The use of cheap, long-range, high-impact technologies has outpaced existing agreements. As Alexander Graef emphasises, states must define their force categories and strategic interests so that they inform the designs of future arms control mechanisms.[8] It is vital to keep diplomatic channels with Russia open, even amid strategic rivalry. It is in our common interest to compartmentalise and develop dialogue on the way to address global challenges and crucial politico-military issues like weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nonproliferation, strategic stability and the military balance along the NATO-Russia contact zone.[9] It is clear that strengthening Europe’s own defence capabilities is essential if transatlantic commitments weaken.[10] But for European deterrence to be credible, it needs to be accompanied by dialogue with Russia. Military capabilities must be consistent with a defined political level of ambition and on a par with those of peer competitors. Otherwise, we will witness accelerating arms races at the expense of social cohesion, as well as the increased likelihood of military incidents and unintended escalations.In a culture of megaphone diplomacy, quiet diplomacy is more valuable than ever.
In a culture of megaphone diplomacy, where press statements, public ultimatums and performative rhetoric are the norm, quiet diplomacy, like Track 2 and 1.5 dialogues, is more valuable than ever. Track 2 dialogues are normally organised between non-state actors. Track 1.5 dialogues are expert-level, unofficial discussions that allow options to be explored without political cost. They foster creative thinking, de-escalation and trust building. During the Cold War, it was this kind of diplomacy that facilitated breakthroughs like the 1975 Helsinki Accords, despite ongoing systemic confrontation. The Helsinki process proved that even adversaries with deep mutual distrust can negotiate principles and procedures to manage conflict.[11] Diplomacy is nowadays all too often confused with media management. As Thomas E. Graham argues, the art of diplomacy lies in engaging adversaries behind closed doors, not broadcasting irreconcilable positions.[12] It is vital that quiet diplomacy is revived, especially through multilateral venues like the OSCE. This is the only way to break out of the deadlock of declaratory posturing. Today, a dialogue with Russia is perceived as a reward for good behaviour. However, it is in Europe’s own interest to go beyond a purely reactional approach, develop a strategy and vision of its future relationship with Russia, consolidate its negotiation position, and start managing deep mistrust by engaging in confidential dialogue.
Peace Matrix as a strategic tool
Frameworks like the Peace Matrix are not only a diagnostic tool to understand layered security challenges, but also envisage pathways to peace and the stabilisation of security in Europe. The Peace Matrix, a product of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, is a comprehensive analytical framework that maps political issues and relationships across three interconnected levels: bilateral (e.g. Ukraine-Russia), regional (e.g. Europe-Russia), and global (e.g. US-Russia).[13] The objective of this approach is to align peacebuilding measures with the specific rationalities and constraints that prevail at each level. For instance, at bilateral level, these rationalities and constraints may include territorial disputes or sovereignty claims; in the context of regional challenges, they may pertain to economic integration; and in the context of global issues, they may relate to arms control or nuclear stability. The matrix emphasises both sequence and simultaneity. It recognises that some moves, like confidence building, must precede others, while some negotiations, like security guarantees and reconstruction, must unfold in tandem. The Peace Matrix is a method for transforming fragmented crisis management into structured, strategic peace facilitation (Figure 1).
Figure 1:
Source: FES/GCSP „Peace Matrix“. https://peace.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Projects/Conversations-on-European-Security_V2.pdf.
The Peace Matrix is a method for transforming fragmented crisis management into strategic peace facilitation.
Applying the Peace Matrix: Building blocks for reconstructing European security
To illustrate the logic of the Peace Matrix, one can envisage a three-phase trajectory for ending the war in Ukraine and reconstituting security in the OSCE area (see map/figure above). This scenario is not a prediction, but rather a structured policy model based on the matrix’s principles.
The primary phase is characterised by the de-escalation of hostilities, facilitated by the transmission of signals of goodwill that are both costly and responsible. Prior to the start of negotiations, it is incumbent upon all key actors to signal their political will through visible and politically costly moves. This may involve operational pauses, partial asset withdrawals, or unilateral transparency steps. These actions, however, are not merely gestures of goodwill but rather serve as credible indicators of a genuine readiness to transition from a state of confrontation to one of negotiation. The EU, too, must act as a signalling power, reaffirming norms without maximalist rhetoric.
The second phase of the process involves challenging negotiations over security guarantees and peace terms. This phase is characterised by the presence of multiple concurrent tracks. These include credible deterrence for Ukraine (both military and political), negotiations on EU accession and reconstruction, and high-stakes talks on territory, force postures, sanctions, and peacekeeping. It is imperative to acknowledge that these intricate matters cannot be deferred to a post-ceasefire phase; they are instrumental in shaping the conditions for peace itself. Therefore, the principles of a conflict resolution would need to be discussed alongside ceasefire modalities.
In phase three, stabilisation and a new security architecture are essential. When the hostilities end and frameworks are in place, the focus must shift to long-term stabilisation. This includes strategic stability talks (e.g. between the US and Russia), an agreed balance of forces in Europe, and addressing the vulnerabilities of neutral or nonaligned states. Russia must be offered a cooperative place in the new order – conditional, but without undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty. A mutual recommitment by all parties to OSCE principles is the only way to consolidate both symbolically and structurally. This could become possible, if a negotiated peace settlement in Ukraine were achieved in phase two. It would need to be a mutually accepted settlement that both parties could credibly present to their constituencies in a manner that allows them to save face.
Military deterrence and sanctions alone will not rebuild European security.
Beyond deterrence
This roadmap does not represent the sole possible future. Alternatives grounded in transactional realism, deterrence dominance, or exclusionary blocs may appear more viable in the short term. However, the likelihood of achieving a sustainable peace is minimal in these scenarios. As the Peace Matrix suggests, sustainable security must be based on inclusive principles, structured dialogue, and incremental steps towards cooperative security rather than a zero-sum logic. It is clear that military deterrence and sanctions alone will not rebuild European security. That task will require political imagination, strategic patience and institutional innovation. The Peace Matrix is not a blueprint; it is an heuristic tool. It invites us to think in stages, across relationship levels, and with an eye towards outcomes rather than positions. Europe must once again prioritise quiet diplomacy, revive multilateralism and embrace inclusive thinking as the pillars of its strategic culture.
The Future of European Security – Ukrainian Perspective(s)
Yevgeniya Gaber is a Ukrainian foreign policy expert and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. She specialises in European and Black Sea security, with a particular focus on Ukraine, Russia, and Türkiye. Her current research focuses on various aspects of Russia’s war in Ukraine, sub-conventional warfare in Europe, and European-led defence and deterrence. Previously, she worked as a foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister of Ukraine (2021) and Deputy Director of the Diplomatic Academy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2018–2021). She also served as a diplomat in the Embassy of Ukraine in Ankara (2014–2018). Yevgeniya is also a GMF Marshall Memorial Fellow, as well as a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Centre in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University in Ottawa. > Homepage
Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine has fundamentally shattered the post-Cold War European security architecture. While Moscow’s violations of the sovereignty of neighbouring states began long before 2022, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine marked a decisive break with international law and the rules-based order. Now, in the eleventh year of the war which began with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukrainians from different regions, age groups, and social backgrounds remain united in their belief that lasting peace can only be achieved through military and economic strength, credible deterrence, accountability for war crimes, and justice.
Ukraine’s existential war and the illusion of a quick peace
The unprecedented scale of Russian atrocities in Ukraine, ranging from the deliberate shelling and torturing of civilians to the abduction of more than 20,000 children,[14] has turned this war into an existential fight for Ukrainians. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s recognition of these actions as genocide speaks to the brutality of Moscow’s indiscriminate attacks on combatants and non-combatants alike.[15] The mass graves, torture chambers, and executions of civilians and POWs have been classified by the UN-mandated Independent International Commission as crimes against humanity.[16] As of March 2025, 183,000 war crimes were officially documented, though the true number is likely to be far higher due to ongoing hostilities and limited access to affected areas.[17]
Any push for negotiations without an increase in pressure on Russia will contribute to ending Ukraine’s resistance rather than ending the war.
The mounting reports of systematic atrocities in the occupied territories,[18] alongside President Putin’s denial of Ukraine’s right to exist,[19] have largely shaped the way Ukrainians see the path forward to peace and security. The widely shared belief in Ukraine is that the Russian leadership has ‘zero interest in a compromise peace’ and any push for negotiations without a concomitant increase in pressure on Russia will contribute to ending Ukraine’s resistance rather than ending the war.[20] As Anne Applebaum noted in her May 2025 article for The Atlantic, ‘nobody in Ukraine thinks the war will end soon’ or believes that ‘the Russian president wants to end the war, or that he will negotiate to do so.’[21]
The ideas of some experts or intellectuals may not be representative of the whole of society. Yet, the results of numerous polls show that this sentiment resonates widely and reflects a broad societal consensus that any peace must come with credible deterrence, justice and accountability for the crime of aggression.
Public attitudes towards negotiations
As the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other potential mediators continue their diplomatic efforts to bring Russia to the negotiating table, Ukrainians remain deeply sceptical of any premature peace settlement that would give Russia time to regroup and attack again. Contrary to the portrayal of Ukrainians as war-weary and desperate for peace at any cost, current data presents a more nuanced picture. A national poll conducted in March 2025 showed that, despite the growing diplomatic pressure on Ukraine, half of Ukrainians believed that ‘under no circumstances should Ukraine give up territories, even if this makes the war last longer’.[22] Regional differences are minimal: 50–51 per cent of people in the west, centre, and south oppose territorial concessions, compared to 42 per cent in the east. While slightly more residents of eastern regions are ‘open to concessions’ (42 per cent vs. 36–40 per cent elsewhere), overall, views across the country remain closely aligned.
Figure 2:
Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1506&page=1.
The Economist Ukrainian Citizens Attitude Survey indicates that 81 per cent of Ukrainians support some form of negotiations with Russia – but, crucially, such support is not unconditional: 79 per cent of respondents reject ceasefire proposals that align entirely with Russian demands or lack robust security guarantees.[23]
Furthermore, according to the April brief of the Mediation and Dialogue Research Center (MDRC), up to 82 per cent of Ukrainians are willing to continue fighting even without US support, illustrating a powerful societal resolve.[24] As Ukrainian intellectual Valeriy Pekar put it, ‘Ukrainians are not tired. They are angry. They are ready to keep fighting – not just soldiers but the whole nation. This includes civil society, business leaders, and intellectuals.’[25] Ukrainians are indeed physically exhausted after years of constant Russian attacks on residential areas and sleepless nights, yet there is no ‘war fatigue’ that would prompt immediate concessions. To stop fighting would mean inviting further devastation and killings by Russia, making the resolution of this dilemma unavoidable: A nation engaged in an existential war cannot survive a ceasefire that favours the aggressor. This alignment between public sentiment and elite opinion underlines a national consensus that meaningful and sustainable peace cannot be achieved through appeasement.
For Ukrainians, any resolution to the war must not only end hostilities but also ensure lasting peace.
The role of security guarantees
For the wider public, the expert community and civil society in Ukraine, any sustainable peace agreement must include functional, credible and enforceable security guarantees. The idea that Ukraine could rely on mere promises or paper agreements, as in the case of the Budapest Memorandum, has been irrevocably discredited. The failure of the Minsk Agreements remains an open wound in Ukrainian national memory, reinforcing public scepticism towards any diplomatic initiative lacking enforcement mechanisms necessary to ‘break the cycle of Russia’s war against Ukraine’.[26]
Two separate polls from the April 2025 brief record 83 per cent and 55 per cent opposition to any ceasefire lacking robust security arrangements.[27] The MDRC report emphasises that although security preferences vary, ‘a stable peace deal requires sufficient, functional security guarantees involving Western allies.’[28] The credibility of such guarantees – based either on a military presence with boots on the ground or binding defence treaties – is seen as essential to prevent further Russian aggression.
While Ukraine’s full NATO membership remains a long-term strategic goal and the strongest security guarantee, there is also ongoing public discussion about alternative deterrence mechanisms to secure peace in Ukraine ‘between now and NATO’.[29] These include ad hoc cooperation formats such as capabilities-focused ‘coalitions of the willing’, investment in the country’s national defence industry, the establishment of robust integrated air defence systems, and continuous financial and military support from Western allies.
Ukrainian experts emphasise that any sign of weakness or lack of resolve on the part of its European partners – especially amid changing US rhetoric – would only embolden Russia.[30] The fear is not just of renewed attacks on Ukraine but of a broader regional destabilisation and intensification of Moscow’s unconventional – ‘hybrid’ – warfare in Europe, aimed at undermining NATO’s unity and Western resilience.[31] As the US Helsinki Commission’s 2024 report documents, more than 150 hybrid attacks have already been conducted on NATO territory by Russia since 2022.[32] A ceasefire that formally legitimises Russian gains would essentially help Moscow prepare for a larger confrontation with NATO, even if its initial goal may simply be ‘destroying the Alliance as a political and military entity capable of opposing Russia.’[33]
Conclusion
In this new security landscape, Ukraine becomes a key security actor and a strategic asset.[34] ‘Caught between an aggressive Russia and a disengaging America’,[35] Europe must develop a long-term strategy to contain Russia, reduce reliance on the United States, and become selfsufficient in defence matters. With experienced military personnel, increased arms production, and deepening security partnerships with key NATO allies, Ukraine is uniquely positioned to play a pivotal role in strengthening European-led defence and securing a lasting peace on the continent. The country has demonstrated remarkable resilience, battlefield innovation, and an ability to rapidly integrate Western military systems while advancing indigenous defence technologies. With Europe strengthening its defence, it needs Ukraine just as much as Ukraine needs Europe.
Ukrainian perspectives on European security go beyond national concerns – they address the fundamental challenge facing the continent: How to build a security architecture capable of deterring aggression while preserving the principles of sovereignty, democracy, and international law that have underpinned European peace and prosperity since 1945. For Ukrainians, any resolution to the war must not only end hostilities but also ensure lasting peace, long-term security, credible deterrence, and justice. Public opinion surveys, expert discussions and civil society appeals clearly indicate a broad societal consensus: Ukrainians are not seeking peace at any price – they are fighting for a secure and just future, for themselves and for Europe.
As a recent joint statement by Ukraine’s leading human rights organisations and civil society representatives underscores, ‘any attempts at “reconciliation” without Ukraine and without justice for survivors and victims are not only unacceptable, but also dangerous for the entire international legal order.’[36] Disregarding these perspectives threatens not only Ukraine’s sovereignty and European security but also the right of all nations to independently determine their future.
Moldova: Countering Insecurities by Leveraging Geopolitics
Box 1: Moldovan National Security and Defence Strategies
Moldovan National Security Strategy 2023
Internal dimension
Territorial integrity and independence
Socio-economic development
Fundamental rights
Combating corruption
Environmental protection
Resolving the Transnistrian conflict
Maintaining peace
External dimension
EU accession and integration into EU security architecture
Stabilisation of the Black Sea region
Moldovan National Defence Strategy 2024
More detailed objectives, including army modernisation and increasing the expenditure for the army to 1 per cent of GDP
EU accession and integration into EU security architecture
Cohabitation of neutrality and ‘frozen conflict’
Moldova’s most significant security threat is linked to the breakaway region of Transnistria, where Russia has maintained a military presence since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The situation in this region, which accounts for roughly 12 per cent of Moldova’s territory and 12 per cent of its population, is beyond Chișinău’s effective control. With the support of the EU’s Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) and the adoption of Western sanctions against Russia, the EU’s share in Transnistria’s overall trade[37] was raised to over 80 per cent in 2024.[38] In security terms, however, the balance of power in Transnistria favours Russia, whose military presence in the separatist region violates Moldova’s permanent neutrality outlined in Article 11 of the constitution. The Russian military presence consists of a rather small Operational Group of Russian Forces (up to 1,500 personnel) located in Transnistria since the early 1990s. It guards 20,000 tons of Soviet stocks in the Colbasna military depot. Russian aggression against neighbouring Ukraine has increased the threat perception regarding Russia’s military intentions in the Transnistrian region, notably regarding the potential to cut Ukraine off from the sea and thus create a land bridge to Transnistria.
In response to the new geopolitical situation, the Moldovan authorities have started investing more in defence.
In response to the new geopolitical situation, the Moldovan authorities have started investing more openly in defence, and took the decision to raise military spending to 1 per cent of Moldova’s GDP by 2030, up from 0.6 per cent in 2025 (about 100 million euros).[39] The ‘5+2’ format, a diplomatic negotiation platform to resolve the Transnistrian conflict, has been dysfunctional since 2019 when the last meeting took place in Bratislava. The EU’s decision to increase its financial aid to Moldova during the 2025 gas crisis in the Transnistrian region[40] was an attempt to encourage the separatist elites to embrace Chișinău’s reintegration plans that ultimately failed. The settlement of the Transnistrian conflict will depend on the terms under which the war in Ukraine ends. The current government in Moldova, as well as Ukraine and the EU, have ruled out the resumption of the ‘5+2’ format.
Russian interference
Information manipulation is one the cheapest ways Russia can influence Moldovan public thinking and voting behaviour.[41] In March 2024, the Supreme Security Council warned that Russia’s disinformation campaign undermines public trust in the electoral process.[42] The current Moldovan government has concentrated its efforts in this policy area, using domestic and European resources. In 2023, the Centre for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation was established,[43] and the EU launched a Partnership Mission (EUPM) focusing on capacity building in countering hybrid threats.[44] Over the past few years, the Security and Information Service has closed dozens of web pages on the grounds of disinformation activity. In parallel, Moldova joined the EU’s sanctions, blocking 19 Russian media platforms from the European space.[45]
Parliamentary elections held in September 2025 were again the target of a massive Russian destabilisation campaign, including electoral interference, disinformation as well as hybrid attacks. The Moldovan authorities discussed the possibility of allowing intelligence services to monitor individuals online if they are found to be involved in disinformation. Other measures to fight disinformation on social media include fining individuals and entities 200 euros and 500 euros, respectively, if they spread disinformation.[46]
Implications of former energy dependencies
Over the past three years, Moldova has faced energy crises rooted in its dependency on Russian gas. In order to find quick solutions, the government maintained a state of emergency, thus allowing the gas market to be redesigned for greater interconnection with the European market. In October 2023, all of Moldova, except for the Transnistria region, transitioned from Russian gas to supplies from European traders.[47] More than a year later, in January 2025, the gas flow from Russia to Moldova via Ukraine completely dried up as a result of Ukraine’s termination of its transit agreement for Russian gas.[48] Amid worsening relations with Moscow over the question of alternative supplies to Transnistria, Moldova accepted the temporary import of Russian gas to Transnistria by a Hungarian energy company.[49]
From 2021 to 2024, during energy crises prompted by disruptions to the Russian gas supply, [50] the EU provided Moldova with 240 million euros to support subsidies for vulnerable social segments.[51] Yet support from the EU did not help Moldova stop the deepening energy poverty: Gas prices rose fivefold, from 3.5 Moldovan lei per m³ (0.18 euros) in 2009–2010[52] to 16.7 Moldovan lei (0.86 euros) in 2024.[53] This led to skyrocketing inflation, leaving as much as onethird of the population below the poverty line, the highest level since 2019. This meant that Russian hybrid warfare had natural targets in Moldova.[54] Poorer voters could be instrumentalised (‘poverty weaponisation’) during the elections by means of vote buying, which played into the hands of far-right politicians and/or pro-Russian political forces.[55] The Moldovan authorities are planning to achieve further integration into the EU energy grid by the end of 2027 through interconnection with Romania (Isaccea-Vulcănești-Chișinău).[56]
Moldova’s vulnerability to political corruption stems from weak institutions and the involvement of oligarchs in political processes.
Political corruption
Moldova’s vulnerability to political corruption stems from weak institutions and the involvement of oligarchs in political processes. Since 2021, when the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) obtained a majority in parliament, political corruption has shifted, but it has not vanished. Illegal funds from businesspeople who are wanted by the Moldovan authorities and Interpol are still used to sway elections. Figures like Vladimir Plahotniuc, Ilan Șor, and Veaceslav Platon are hiding abroad, accused of trying to interfere in Moldovan elections on Russia’s behalf. In the past three years, Șor has enabled significant flows of illegal funds to political parties aligned with the ‘Victory’ Bloc, launched from Moscow in April 2024. He is also accused of manipulating the outcome of the EU integration referendum held in October, where the turnout was below 50 per cent – not counting the diaspora[57] – and only 25 per cent of the electorate voted ‘in favour’.[58] The Moldovan police has initiated criminal investigations into various representatives of Șor’s political parties, including Evghenia Guțul, head of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia. She was brought into custody for 20 days in late March 2025 and subsequently placed under house arrest.[59] The Moldovan government suspects that Russia is using Șor’s leverage in Gagauzia to destabilise the country from within.[60]
As of May 2023, Moldova benefited from sanctions imposed by the EU and Western partners against individual Șor-linked politicians and other oligarchs, which were renewed in April 2025.[61] Furthermore, between 2023 and 2024, the Moldovan authorities allowed for the imposition of Western sanctions against Moldovan citizens.[62]
Rapprochement with the EU: Moldova’s key security asset
Moldova is also intensifying its security cooperation with the EU to acquire tools to handle threats beyond Russia. The Security and Defence Partnership, which the EU launched with Moldova in May 2024, makes it possible to address resilience and work jointly on shared security challenges. It builds on the High-Level Political and Security Dialogue with the EU, launched in 2021, and the 2017 agreement on the exchange of classified information. This enhances Moldova’s existing engagement in the EU’s European Peace Facility, making it the second largest beneficiary after Ukraine, with 128 million euros allocated since 2021.[63]
Moldova also agreed to deploy the first generation of the EU’s civilian anti-hybrid threat missions (the aforementioned EUPM) and it remains involved in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. Although only nine national experts participated in the latter from 2014 to 2021,[64] the acquired peace-keeping knowledge could eventually be transferred to the Transnistrian conflict settlement. The active security dialogue with the EU has outpaced cooperation with NATO, where both participation in the KFOR Mission in Kosovo and donations of military equipment by, and partnerships with, NATO member states (Germany,[65] France,[66] etc.) serve to increase interoperability (e.g. in air defence[67]). At the same time, public support for NATO remains low (25 per cent),[68] while Moldova’s defence strategy continues to be designed around Russian threats.
Conclusion
Moldova’s lack of effective security-related policies in various crucial policy fields seems to rest on the reliability and willingness of external actors to help. The EU and other Western partners have played a significant role compensating for Moldova’s inability to handle present insecurities. European integration can contribute to building a sounder security environment in Moldova, but there is no guarantee that the country’s current pro-EU foreign policy will always be sustained in future elections. It’s in the interest of both Moldova’s political elites and EU institutions to preserve Moldova’s gains in the security field, including vis-à-vis Russian threats.
The security situation will be shaped by the EU’s ability to incorporate Eastern neighbourhood states into an emerging European security architecture.
Societal Views on an Emerging European Security Actor – the View from Poland
Poland finds itself today at the centre of geopolitical tensions. It is forced by circumstances to redefine its role within the European and global security framework. For years, the country placed an emphasis on security, yet without significantly increasing investments. Since the fullscale Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, security has become an absolute priority, and society at large recognises the necessity of higher spending.
Growing international tensions, the migration crisis on the border with Belarus artificially created and orchestrated by Minsk, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and instability along NATO’s eastern flank have reinforced the Polish authorities’ conviction that national stability depends on three pillars: a strong military, allied cooperation, and economic independence.
A strong military
With near-unanimous public support for boosting Poland’s defence capabilities (see figure 3 below), the government increased the defence budget from around 2 per cent before 2022 to 4.7 per cent of GDP in 2025 – one of the highest shares across NATO member states. There are plans to increase the total pool of combatants to 500,000 personnel, with 300,000 active servicemen and women as well as 200,000 volunteers receiving basic training. These measures reflect Poland’s heightened state of alert.
Figure 3:
Source: CBOS (2025), Postulowane priorytety rządu Donalda Tuska po roku działalności, nr 5/2025, https://cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/flashe/pliki/2025/fl_005_2025.pdf
Poland is a frontline state and trendsetter in the EU’s and NATO’s evolving security posture.
Allied cooperation
Together with other countries on NATO’s eastern flank, Poland had long warned of the threat of war emanating from the Kremlin; a warning many Western politicians did not heed. Poland has also been one of the leading supporters of Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, accepting refugees and providing military equipment and logistics hubs for war deliveries. Poland plays a unique security role at the EU-Ukraine border: It is a frontline state and trendsetter in the EU’s and NATO’s evolving security posture. It has been a strong advocate of increases in defence spending and changes in the alliance’s strategic priorities since February 2022.
Donald Tusk, prime minister of Poland since December 2023, won the 2023 elections with a promise to significantly improve Poland’s position within the European Union and European security landscape, overcoming the eight years of tensions under the previous PiS government. Poland’s EU Council presidency in 2024 showcased the new government’s ability to lead on key issues in relation to Ukraine, including defence funding, sanctions, and energy security.
The presence of US troops in Poland and the country’s strong security-oriented relationship with the US have strengthened Poland’s position in EU negotiations. As well as supporting the EU Commission’s European Defence Fund and devoting substantial resources to the EU’s security infrastructure, Poland has been at the forefront of a shift towards dual-use technologies in EU economic policy. The government pushed for the EU Cohesion Funds to be leveraged in support of its own dual-use sector. Besides that, Poland is investing heavily in its rearmament.
Public concerns
At the same time, public concern over security is growing. As many as 82 per cent of Poles believe that the war in Ukraine poses a direct threat to their country – one of the highest levels recorded since the conflict began. In addition, 38 per cent of the respondents consider NATO’s response to the war too cautious (this figure was 47 per cent in 2022, see figure 4 below).[69] There is a general attitude that the broader international community has not done enough to resolve the conflict.
Preparedness is now seen as a priority not only at governmental level but also within society.
Figure 4:
Source: CBOS (2024), Polacy o wojnie w Ukrainie, 130/2024, https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2024/K_130_24.PDF.
In the changed security context, the vast majority of Poles are in favour of strengthening national defence. High and growing defence spending, as well as military engagement, are no longer viewed as unnecessary and less important than spending, for example, on healthcare and education.
However, attitudes towards the war in Ukraine are shifting. For the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion, over half of respondents (55 per cent) believe that the conflict should be resolved, even if that requires Ukraine to cede part of its territory or sovereignty.[70] This stance is at odds with the views of the country’s political leaders, who argue that such concessions will only embolden Russia in its imperial ambitions, thereby increasing the threat to Poland. In addition, many Poles would like the EU to respond more effectively to security challenges. The main priorities for the EU, as identified by Polish citizens, include enhancing security and defence cooperation (52 per cent), limiting migration (48 per cent), and reducing economic disparities across Europe (46 per cent). At the same time, 64 per cent of Poles believe their country does not have enough influence over EU decision-making, while only 25 per cent are satisfied with Poland’s role in shaping EU policies.[71]
Figure 5:
Source: CBOS (2024), Przed prezydencją Polski w Radzie UE, nr 129/2024, https://cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/raporty/open_file.php?id=6935.
Public opinion in Poland reflects some of these concerns. In February, the centre for public opinion research CBOS found that inflation and high prices (73 per cent) and difficulties in accessing medical care (67 per cent) were the most frequently discussed topics among citizens.[72] These issues have dominated public debate for the last two years. While security remains a priority, if additional defence spending results in an underfunded healthcare system or further economic strain, public frustration will mount.
How can Poland restructure its spending to ensure national defence without compromising on societal needs?
Poland now faces a critical question: How can it restructure its spending to ensure national defence without compromising on societal needs? If this balance is not achieved, the country may witness an increase in populism.
Regional security formats
The return of Poland to an active role in all regional cooperation formats (Nordic, Baltic, Visegrad, and, most notably, the Weimar Triangle) ensures that Poland’s voice counts. After a number of high-level meetings of the Coalition of the Willing with Tusk on board, Poland is now recognised as a leading advocate for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) within that platform, where it has not tired of arguing that any concessions to Russia will only increase the threat to Poland, the CEE region and NATO’s eastern flank.
Poland aspires to be a strong partner for Ukraine and within the EU and the transatlantic alliance. Here, it must rely on its own resources.[73] Poland’s security-oriented initiatives and investments, backed by economic growth and the development of dual-use technologies and cyber and deep-tech tools, show how seriously Poland’s leaders take this challenge. Partnerships with countries that share its democratic values and strategic objectives will enable Poland to enhance both its defence and economic capabilities. It will also mitigate the risk of dependence on nations with conflicting geopolitical interests.
Public Attitudes in Ukraine and Russia Towards the War and European Security
The war in Ukraine has significantly impacted public opinion all over Europe, shaping attitudes towards war and peace, relations with Russia and possible negotiations to end the war. Since the US presidential election in November 2024, the debate around potential negotiations has intensified. The factors influencing this shift include fears of a US-Russia agreement with dire consequences for Ukraine, war fatigue in the Ukrainian population, and evolving military realities that could have wider implications for European security. Public sentiment also remains a critical consideration for policymakers in both Ukraine and Russia, where perceptions of victory and acceptable concessions diverge widely.[74]
Entrenched positions and the prospect of negotiations
Polling data from September 2024 reveals strong tendencies in favour of negotiations. A significant majority in both countries supports initiating negotiations without preconditions, with 76 per cent of Russians and 56 per cent of Ukrainians being against a complete refusal of talks. However, entrenched narratives present challenges.[75]
Not surprisingly, the majority of Ukrainians advocate for the immediate return of all occupied territories, including Crimea. At the same time, 57 per cent of Ukrainians would accept the initiation of negotiations with no preconditions, reflecting a pragmatic disposition to pursue diplomatic resolutions. Gallup, one of the leading opinion research institutes, produced its own surveys in Ukraine in the same period, which yielded similar results with regard to support for negotiations. As figure 6 below shows, support among Ukrainians for initiating negotiations as soon as possible stood at just over 50 per cent at that time and has since risen to around 70 per cent. In the case of Russia, 54 per cent of respondents expressed support for starting negotiations without preconditions. This data indicates that the public appetite for pursuing a desired political goal by military means is steadily dwindling. In both societies, people would favour resolving the conflict by diplomatic means.
Figure 6:
In both societies, people would favour resolving the conflict by diplomatic means.
The contentious issue of Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership further complicates negotiations. Ukrainians strongly favour accession to these organisations, which they see as a guarantee of future security and economic development. Conversely, Russians perceive NATO’s eastward enlargement as a direct threat and are sceptical of Western alliances in general. In key European states like Germany, France, and Italy, public opinion is divided, with no clear majority supporting Ukraine’s NATO membership. This lack of consensus underscores some of the complexities of Ukraine’s integration into Western structures.
Pathways to negotiations: conditions for progress
Despite these entrenched positions, polling data identifies several areas where common ground may be found. In both societies, there is public support for measures that could serve as stepping stones to negotiations, offering a basis for confidence building and incremental progress.
Recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty stands out as a pivotal issue. While 89.3 per cent of Ukrainians demand full sovereignty recognition, 45 per cent of Russians also express a willingness to accept that, evidence that a significant minority in Russia acknowledges Ukraine’s statehood and sovereignty over its territory. Additionally, the release of prisoners of war (POWs) emerges as a broadly supported measure. In Ukraine, 90.4 per cent support a POW exchange as a key step towards de-escalation, compared to 80 per cent of Russians.
This consensus underscores the humanitarian aspect of negotiations, where progress could be achieved even amid broader political disagreements.[76]
Other de-escalation measures, particularly regarding attacks on critical infrastructure, resonate with both populations. About 61 per cent of Russians believe Ukraine should cease its attacks on Russian infrastructure as a precondition for talks, while nearly 90 per cent of Ukrainians want Russia to stop its attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure (some 51 per cent of Russians also believe their country should cease its attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure). This data suggests that there is an awareness of the devastating impact of continued escalation, which could be a basis for reciprocal agreements.[77]
While these conditions offer opportunities for engagement, for a sustainable negotiation process, deeper political and security concerns also need to be addressed. Establishing clear frameworks for monitoring compliance, ensuring transparency, and maintaining consistent dialogue channels is essential. Additionally, since leaders in both countries can still be swayed by public opinion, it will also be crucial to foster domestic support for compromises.
Lastly, younger Russians have a more conciliatory outlook on key issues. Among those under 40, 52 per cent support ending hostilities, and 52 per cent would accept Ukrainian territorial sovereignty. Additionally, 45 per cent of individuals aged 18–29 are open to Russia withdrawing forces as a precondition for negotiations, while 89 per cent in the same age group are in favour of opening negotiations.[78] This generational shift holds the promise of reconciliation in the long term.
The role of international mediators
International mediators often play an important role in protracted conflicts, providing impartiality, fostering dialogue, and facilitating agreements. However, in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, previous mediation efforts by institutions like the UN, the OSCE, and the EU have faced significant challenges. The numerous crises and conflicts around the world, as well as the waning reputation and erratic conduct of exclusive organisations and individual powerful states, underscore the need for inclusive institutions that prioritise balancing interests. The Security Radar 2025 data is clear: The UN is the most trusted institution among respondents.[79]
While traditionally a forum for conflict resolution, the United Nations has been limited by political divisions within the Security Council. Russia’s status as a permanent member has obstructed effective diplomatic action. The UN has played a humanitarian role, but its capacity to enforce negotiations or impose accountability remains constrained.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) initially played a role in monitoring the situation in Ukraine, particularly in the Donbas region. However, its efforts were hindered by Russia’s obstructionist approach and accusations of partiality. An inability to enforce ceasefires or ensure compliance with agreements further weakened its credibility.
The European Union has also struggled to assume a mediating role. While it has been a key supporter of Ukraine with financial aid, sanctions on Russia, and military assistance, this alignment has meant that it is not perceived as a neutral mediator. Russia views the EU as an adversarial actor, reducing the effectiveness of any EU-led mediation initiative.
Public sentiment should be taken more into consideration by policymakers keen to bring about a sustainable peace.
Avenues for diplomatic progress
For future mediation efforts to succeed, certain conditions need to be met. First, mediators must have the trust of both parties. Second, mediators must facilitate incremental agreements that address immediate humanitarian and security concerns. And third, inclusive dialogue is necessary. Civil society organisations, non-governmental actors, and regional institutions should be involved alongside state actors to ensure that diverse perspectives are represented. Finally, international mediators must be equipped with enforcement mechanisms and guarantees. Without credible assurances that agreements will be upheld, the risk of failure remains high.
Public opinion in Ukraine and Russia remains complex, marked by deep-seated grievances and aspirations. However, areas of consensus, such as POW exchanges and the de-escalation of attacks on critical infrastructure, provide openings for diplomatic progress. Policymakers should leverage these insights for negotiation strategies and emphasise pragmatic, phased approaches. International mediation involving non-Western actors could enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the process. Ultimately, while public sentiment alone cannot determine outcomes, it remains a vital factor that should be taken more into consideration by policymakers keen to bring about a sustainable peace and ensure European security.
Concluding remarks
As we witness renewed attempts by the US administration in summer 2025 to bring Russia to the negotiation table and in November releasing a draft proposal for a 28-point plan, the pattern remains the same: Ukraine and European leaders have to fight to be included and concessions are granted mostly to Russia. European/EU leaders in the rear keep trying to safeguard Ukraine and make Donald Trump consider Kyiv’s interests. Thus, we are reminded yet again of how lopsided security perceptions turn out if not all perspectives are considered.
Even within this report, contradictions have become clear. While Simon Weiß calls for quiet diplomacy, a revival of multilateralism and inclusivity, Yevgeniya Gaber views military deterrence, increased arms production, containment and self-sufficiency in defence matters as more viable long-term strategies to safeguard peace in Europe. The pivotal question is to what extent these positions and demands could be compatible after all and what the role of Russia would be ultimately. If there is no consensus among EU member states, OSCE states, and Ukraine, the Baltic States and Poland about how to handle the multiple security challenges in Europe, then it is hardly conceivable that Russia and the US or Russia and Ukraine (and its Western Allies) would ever agree on these questions.
Political imagination, strategic patience and institutional innovation are required for a new mode of peaceful coexistence.
Yet, security is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon. Once the fighting in Ukraine comes to an end, in order to avoid further escalation, the different sides will require, as Alexandra Dienes and Simon Weiß have phrased it, political imagination, strategic patience and institutional innovation to find a new mode of peaceful coexistence. And they would be well advised to listen to the opinions of their respective populations, in Ukraine and Russia in particular, where perceptions of victory and acceptable concessions still diverge widely, as Weiß explains. But they should also listen to the ‘in-between’/non-aligned states, such as Moldova, that have been badly affected by the war of aggression in Ukraine and geopolitical polarisation. The security issues, threats and challenges each of them faces are very different, as Denis Cenusa illustrates in the Moldovan case.
Finally, the northeastern frontline states, such as Poland (contribution by Magdalena Jakubowska and Anna Kuczyńska), have been shaken in their ontological security and have developed a new security consciousness that departs to some extent from the security objectives and the strategic culture of restraint of Western European states. Their primary security concern is to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine and thereby curtail Russia’s imperial ambitions. These perspectives also need to be taken into account in order not to create a breeding ground for further internal disagreements among European allies. Aligning security interests and perceptions as well as defining Russia’s role in European Security and relations will become important tasks in the future.
As Dienes and Weiß have shown, public opinion data reveals some areas where Ukrainian and Russian society converge that could yet play a role in achieving progress towards an end to hostilities. Consensus on, for example, the exchange of prisoners of war, could become a basis for agreements on windows of silence and the de-escalation of attacks on critical infrastructure. A phased approach goes against the trend of transactional deal-making, but it is more likely to produce sustainable results. As Dienes and Weiß have indicated, the option of bringing on board third-party mediators that have good relations with both Russia and Ukraine continues to be on the agenda. Next to Türkiye, Brazil, or the Gulf states, the classical neutral states of Switzerland and Austria are contenders here, but also states like Kazakhstan or Malta.
Finally, the growing polarisation in Europe has not only affected the security order and security institutions like the EU, NATO and the OSCE, but also left unaligned countries in a position where their inherent security interests have been oversimplified and partly disregarded. Avenues and entry points for further research on diverging security perceptions in Europe would include or address the root causes of security-political regional polarisation. A viable regional setting for these states remains an important element of European security in the future.
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[3] Ibid. 2023: 9-11
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[5] Ibid. 2023.
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[28] Ibid.
[29] Catherine Sendak and Ilya Timtchenko, ‘Between Now and NATO: A Security Strategy for Ukraine’, 16 January 2025, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/between-now-and-nato-a-security-strategy-for-ukraine/.
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[34] Paul Jones, ‘Ukraine Is a US Strategic Asset — Don’t Lose It’, 15 May 2025, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-is-a-us-strategic-asset-dont-lose-it/.
[35] Keir Giles, ‘Who will defend Europe?’ 15 February 2025, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/f268359a-7347-4285-b646-4353f7d6a865.
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[37] Denis Cenusa, ‘Tensions around the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova: early signs of an escalation scenario and future prospects’, 20 February 2024, GSSC Review, https://www.gssc.lt/en/publication/tensions-around-the-transnistrian-conflict-in-moldova-early-signs-of-an-escalation-scenario-and-future-prospects/.
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[40] European Commission, ‘European Commission and Moldova agree on a 2-year Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and immediate support with the energy bills’, 4 February 2025, Press communiqué, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/ip_25_403.
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[44] European Union External Action Service (no date), EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM) https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eupm-moldova_en.
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[46] Denis Cenusa, ‘Protecting the Moldovan media space before the elections: online censorship or combating Russian disinformatio’, EVZ.ro, 24 March 2025, https://evz.ro/protejarea-spatiului-media-din-moldova-inainte-de-alegeri-cenzura-online-sau-combaterea-dezinformarii-rusesti.html.
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[55] Denis Cenusa, ‘Russia’s hybrid warfare on EU enlargement’, The Loop, ECPR’s Political Science Blog, 2025, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/russias-hybrid-war-on-eu-enlargement/.
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[59] Alexander Tanas, ‘Moldova broadens probe into pro-Russian group after detention of ethnic minority leader’ 28 March 2025, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/another-pro-russian-politician-stopped-leaving-moldova-2025-03-27/.
[60] Ecaterina Arvintii, ‘Sandu, in Gagauzia: “Those who try to destabilize the autonomy and the country have only one goal – to bring corrupt groups back to power” ‘, 10 April 2024, https://newsmaker.md/ro/sandu-in-gagauzia-cei-care-incearca-sa-destabilizeze-autonomia-si-tara-au-un-singur-obiectiv-sa-readuca-gruparile-corupte-la-carma-tarii.
[61] Cristian Bolotnicov, ‘EU extends sanctions against Plahotniuc, Shor, associations and Eurasia’ 16 April 2025, RFE/RL, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/ue-prelungeste-sanctiunile-pentru-plahotniuc-sor-asociatii-si-evrazia-/33386871.html.
[62] Amendments to Law No. 25, 23 January 2025, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=143339&lang=ro#.
[63] European Commission, ‘European Peace Facility strengthens Moldova’s defence capabilities’, 14 June 2024, https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/news/european-peace-facility-strengthens-moldovas-defence-capabilities-2024-06-14_en.
[64] Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Moldova (no date), The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), https://mfa.gov.md/ro/content/politica-europeana-de-aparare-si-securitate-comuna.
[65] Moldova 1, ‘The Republic of Moldova will receive military equipment from Germany’, 19 September 2024, https://moldova1.md/p/35828/the-republic-of-moldova-will-receive-military-equipment-from-germany.
[66] John Irish, ‘Moldova signs defence pact with France amid Russia’, 7 March 2024, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-signs-defence-pact-with-france-amid-russia-fears-2024-03-07/.
[67] NATO Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Joint Visit to Moldova Brings NATO Legislators Face-to-Face with the Significant Challenges Confronting the Eastern Flank Partner’, 8 April 2025, https://www.nato-pa.int/news/joint-visit-moldova-brings-nato-legislators-face-face-significant-challenges-confronting.
[68] IMAS, Socio-political barometer, Republic of Moldova, April 2025, https://imas.md/pic/archives/48/[imas]%20barometrul%20socio-politic_aprilie%202025.pdf.
[69] CBOS, ‘Polish opinions on the war in Ukraine’, 130/2024, https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2024/K_130_24.PDF.
[70] Ibid.
[71] CBOS, ‘Opinions before the Polish Presidency of the EU Council’, 129/2024, https://cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/raporty/open_file.php?id=6935.
[72] CBOS, ‘What’s being talked about lately?’, 7/2025, https://cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/flashe/pliki/2025/fl_007_2025.pdf.
[73] Magda Jakubowska, Tomasz Kasprowicz and Wojciech Przybylski, The US Redraws Economic Security: Partnerships Must be Backed by Force – EDITORIAL, 4 April 2025, https://visegradinsight.eu/the-us-redraws-economic-security-partnerships-must-be-backed-by-force-editorial/.
[74] It should be borne in mind here that opinion polls play diverging roles in Russia and Ukraine, given the differences in political systems, which also affects the character of the responses.
[75] The data is based on the Security Radar 2025 of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: https://peace.fes.de/security-radar-2025.html and on the Gallup World Poll Ukraine 2025: https://news.gallup.com/poll/693203/ukrainian-support-war-effort-collapses.aspx.
[76] Security Radar 2025 of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: https://peace.fes.de/security-radar-2025.html.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.