Publication date:
Citation: Nadja Douglas, Míla O’Sullivan, Yuliya Yurchuk, Oleksii Vasyliuk, Tetiana Skrypchenko, Andrian Prokip, Emancipatory dimensions of in:security – strategies of coping with war challenges in Ukraine, KonKoop In:Security Report 1/2025
Image: Bridge, Ukraine, Carpathians, 2017 (c) SLPix, pixabay, Pixabay Content License
Imprint: The research network ‘Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe: The Consequences of the Reconfiguration of Political, Economic, and Social Spaces since the End of the Cold War’ (KonKoop) is a project headed by ZOiS and funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (https://konkoop.de/,
Grant No. 01UG2209A-F).
Acknowledgment: The editor cordially thanks Niklas Balbon for his review and constructive comments on the manuscript.
The collective trauma of Russian imperialism generated new momentum for post-colonial / feminist discourses not only in Ukraine.
We explore the consequences of three years of war at the grassroots level and among the most vulnerable groups.
Approaching security through a feminist lens can further the understanding of war-induced insecurities, envisioning emancipatory transformations.
Ukraine’s continuing efforts in the area of gender emancipation are both enabled and threatened by the war.
A feminist perspective is sorely needed in discussions on a future security system to prevent wars, including security guarantees for Ukraine.
In Ukraine, decolonisation is taking place on the level of official politics and on the level of grassroots ‘personal’ decolonisation.
Ukrainian society faces a threat not only to its existential but also to its epistemological security, meaning the belief in one’s knowledge about oneself.
59% of the Ukrainian population in 2022 are in favour of renaming places named after Soviet and Russian figures.
Individuals share their own stories of liberation from colonial epistemologies and inscribe them into the tapestry of collective identities in Ukraine.
Decolonisation becomes a powerful tool for personal transformation and the integration of a difficult reality into new life narratives.
The entire occupied territory is currently mined – it could take up to 750 years to demine the area.
While the focus has primarily been on human casualties and infrastructure damages, consequences for the environment are no less severe.
Fires resulting from shelling and explosions destroy vast areas of forest that will take over a lifetime to regenerate.
It is possible to learn from the experience of nature restoration at the Kakhovka reservoir when planning the restoration of ecosystems after similar events.
The war in Ukraine leaves deep scars on nature, which will be felt not only in the near future, but for centuries to come.
Levels of resilience vary across different groups and are lower e.g. among the less affluent population and women.
A resilient society is more likely to sustain cohesion, but weak cohesion can make it harder to stay resilient.
Significant national events, such as military victories, boost collective morale, but are short-lived.
Routine activities are significant as a key to staying resilient.
Future reintegration efforts should consider the gap between those who experienced occupation and rebuilding and those who did not.
A more systematic approach is needed that integrates both levels, ensuring that national policies amplify and strengthen what works locally.
Ukraine has become not only a symbol of resistance but also of the vast potential of emancipation.
Security in and around Ukraine is more multifaceted than realist discourses around deterrence and rearmament suggest.
Introduction
Nadja Douglas (editor) is a political scientist and researcher at ZOiS, and the coordinator of the KonKoop topic line ‘In:Security in Eastern Europe’. Currently, she is engaged in a project at the Institute of International and Security Affairs (SWP), investigating the role of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in an evolving European security order. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Sciences Po Paris and a PhD from Humboldt University Berlin. > Homepage
Russia’s war of aggression has not only caused appalling atrocities and terrible destruction in Ukraine; it has also set back societal progress and security in various domains, including gender and social equality, historical justice and self-perception, societal cohesion and environmental protection. These dimensions of in:security have been widely overlooked in ongoing discourses with their emphasis on hard security issues.
And yet, the collective trauma of a resurgent Russian imperialism unites vulnerable groups and entities on the ground. Post-colonial and feminist discourses around this trauma have gained momentum since the beginning of the Russian full-scale military invasion, not only in Ukraine, but also elsewhere in the former Soviet space. This, ultimately, has consequences for the region and for European security in a larger sense.
Emancipation in general is a powerful tool of societal resilience in the face of authoritarianism. Thus, Ukraine’s emancipatory discourses and practices play a particularly crucial role in the resistance against the Russian invasion. The notion of ‘security as emancipation’ has long been at the centre of Critical Security Studies, which include a much wider range of potential threats, from economic and environmental issues to human rights and migration.[1] It offers a substantiated critique of traditional views of security and dominant state-centric assumptions, adopting instead a normative approach that links security to the goal of emancipation. ‘Security as emancipation’ is based on three ideas: 1) the focus on individuals as the ultimate referent of security; 2) the idea that security understandings and practices are political in their assumptions and implications; and 3) the normative commitment towards redressing insecurity and orientation towards transformation.[2] Kenneth Booth, one of the proponents of the emancipatory approach to security, has defined security as the absence of threats, and thus presented emancipation ‘as the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they freely choose to do’. He goes as far as stating that ‘security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security.’[3] Emancipation in this sense is a process rather than an end point, a direction rather than a destination.
The ‘politics of security’, inherent to critical approaches to security, implies an awareness of the political assumptions that underlie understandings and practices of security. It, moreover, takes the processes and struggles through which they are reproduced and contested into consideration. Given its concerns with issues from the realm of sustainable development – human rights, poverty, safety from violence, etc. – ‘security as emancipation’ often overlaps with the human security agenda. Human security builds on the idea that people’s rights are at least as important as those of states, with its core concern being the inextricable interrelationship between ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’.[6] Therefore, environmental security or the ecological dimension of security represents another challenge presented by war-induced damages. Environmental destruction, also labelled ‘ecocide’, and the consequences for global climate change have as yet remained below the radar of international perception. The environmental dimension thus feeds into the concept of human and societal security.
In a similar vein, this report seeks to focus on humans and communities for whom the present situation is a cause of great insecurity. In line with previous In:Security Reports, which are a product of the research network KonKoop,[7] we again employ elements from vernacular security theories, with the concepts of ‘security as emancipation’ and ‘human security’ being inextricably linked. This does beg the question of where to stop when broadening the concept of security, since security ultimately relates to everything that is potentially under threat. Thus, we concentrate mainly on those issues that are product of what one would call from a socio-critical perspective a distorted power relation. The report thus emphasises the notion of ‘security from below’ and asks whether these neglected dimensions have the potential to bring about some sort of recovery or liberating effect for equally neglected people on the ground.
The present report summarises the results of the third In:Security Workshop held online on 16 October 2024 on ‘Emancipatory Dimensions of In:Security’ as part of KonKoop’s topic line ‘In:Security’. The topic line investigates how security is perceived, experienced and enacted by ordinary citizens and how ‘societal security’ in Europe has transformed in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The workshop was dedicated to the feminist, post-/de-colonial, ecological and societal dimensions of security and insecurity. Participants focused mainly on the Ukrainian case, but also drew comparisons to the situation in wider Eastern Europe. The purpose of the workshop was to pool expertise and enhance interdisciplinary exchange among the participants. This report is based on the exploratory research presented at the workshop by experts from Ukraine and the Czech Republic who then elaborated on the overarching question of how in:security has evolved and partly led to emancipatory/liberating attitudes and effects.
With regard to the choice of methods adopted in this report, we found it necessary to rethink what security means and whose voice is heard in the production of knowledge on security. Thus, our approach is based on a self-reflexive standpoint and positionality, conscious of the imbalances in the process of knowledge production. Regrettably, until today scholars from the region are marginalised in the production of knowledge on security. The epistemic imperialism of European partners that are – at least in academia – often still stuck in a system of knowledge production that is eurocentric and does not make it easier for Ukrainians to justify the defence of their homeland.
We strive not just to write about Ukraine, but also to let Ukrainian scholars voice and problematise their perspectives. To that end, we explore the social and environmental consequences of three years of war in Ukraine, attempting to provide insights into what is happening at the grassroots level and/or among the most vulnerable groups in Ukrainian society. We thus seek to draw a nuanced picture of their security and insecurity in times of war and violent oppression.
The first contribution by Míla O’Sullivan approaches the topic from a feminist perspective as embodied everyday insecurity. She sheds light on the multiple war-induced insecurities that, as part of Russia’s (ideological) warfare, reinforce the global normalisation of anti-gender radicalism. O’Sullivan shows how gender has become a central battlefield between an increasingly illiberal gender order in Russia, and the Ukrainian experience of an emancipatory and liberalising trend with regard to gender discourses. Ultimately, O’Sullivan pleads for a feminist re-thinking of deterrence beyond the nuclear umbrella through practices of societal defence and a whole-of-society approach to resilience.
The second contribution by Yuliya Yurchuk reflects on the momentum post-colonial and decolonial discourses have gained in Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian military invasion. These discussions, according to Yurchuk, take place at the level of official politics and at grassroots level, including efforts towards ‘personal’ decolonisation. While at the official level, decolonisation takes the form of nationalisation, she argues that at the grassroots level it is a means of liberation, self-empowerment and adaptation to radical insecurity. Yurchuk depicts decoloniality as an ongoing process of resistance and a condition for Ukraine’s victory in the war.
The third contribution by Ukrainian environmental activist Oleksii Vasyliuk summarises the presentation by himself and his colleague Eugene Simonov during the workshop on 16 October 2024. It delineates the effects of the war on human and environmental security in Ukraine. The compelling account of the damages wrought by the war on landscapes and ecosystems in Ukraine, with a particular focus on forests and lands, draws attention to the difficulties of post-war reconstruction. Despite the sobering situation, Vasyliuk discusses opportunities for the conversion of post-war ecosystems, for example in the Kakhovka Reservoir and Velikyi Luh.
The final contribution by Tetiana Skrypchenko emphasises the importance of the resilience prism in the context of societal responses to the war and the strengthening of societal cohesion in a society under occupation. She draws on recent survey data among the Ukrainian civilian population and military personnel. The results provide insights into the well-being of the most vulnerable social-demographic groups in Ukraine, which have had to cope with increased levels of stress and insecurity. Skrypchenko shows how the war prompted a remarkable surge in cohesion. In fact, she argues that cohesion and resilience are interrelated, as a resilient society is more likely to sustain cohesion, but weak cohesion can make it harder to stay resilient. She recommends that national approaches learn from community lessons and localised strategies in terms of recovery and resilience building. They have the potential to amplify and strengthen what works locally.
The concluding part illustrates the multifaceted nature of the security discourses in and beyond Ukraine and calls for a recognition of the emancipatory paths societal groups in Ukraine have chosen in resistance to Russian occupation.
Feminist Security and Defence in Russia’s War on Ukraine
Míla O’Sullivan is a researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague with a primary focus on feminist approaches to security, gender and war and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. She researches Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian war on Ukraine, feminist approaches to NATO and deterrence, and anti-gender mobilisation. She also addresses decolonial issues and East-South-West hierarchies in feminist knowledge production. > Homepage
Russia’s war on gender
Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and the full-scale war it launched in 2022 build on a long history of Russian and Soviet imperial violence in the region and elsewhere. As in its past war practices, Russia is waging a deeply gendered and racialised war that includes ethnic cleansing and systemic sexual and gender-based violence. In a wider sense it also includes the systemic oppression and military exploitation of indigenous populations from Central Asia and occupied areas of Ukraine, such as Crimean Tatars.[9] In Ukraine, multiple gendered insecurities have resulted from the war-induced disruption of millions of livelihoods and reproductive healthcare, the escalation of gender-based violence, as well as intersecting vulnerabilities, especially among female internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
The novelty of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that it is not only a gendered military conflict but also part of Russia’s war against gender and sexual equalities aimed at putting a halt to emancipatory tendencies in Ukraine.[10] The war was preceded by the consolidation of Russia’s anti-gender regime domestically and in the foreign policy of promoting the values of the Russian world (Russki mir), manifested in Orthodox fundamentalism, anti-gender radicalism and homophobia.[11] This ideological warfare underpins Russia’s imperialist strategy and informs decisions to subjugate Ukraine by killing, raping and torturing. Russia’s war crimes, crimes against humanity and disregard of international law thus reinforce the global normalisation of anti-democratic and anti-rights politics and contribute to the decline of the rule-based international order.
Ukraine’s continuing efforts in the area of gender emancipation are both enabled and threatened by the war. As well as redefining gender roles, the active involvement of women in civilian and military resistance is having an emancipatory effect.[12] The swift ratification of the Istanbul Convention in June 2022 was closely connected to the geopolitical struggle, but it was preceded by years of campaigning by Ukrainian feminist and LGBTQ+ organisations.[13] Similarly, both civil society and government actors have responded to the full-scale war through the localisation of Ukraine’s second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (WPS).[14] Yet, the profound gendered impacts of the war, including gender-based violence, demographic decline and forced militarisation, are threatening Ukraine’s emancipatory future. Gender-based violence, which was already a serious problem before 2022, is drastically increasing.[15] Europe and other international actors must do more to support Ukraine by challenging the gender-oblivious recovery planning imposed on Ukraine.[16] It is also important to address the East-West hierarchies that manifest in the continuum of violence in the EU, where Ukrainian women face labour and sexual exploitation and gender-based violence.
Self-defence as a decolonising feminist practice
Feminist approaches to self-defence, territorial defence and deterrence are vital in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Prior to 2022, they – like Europe’s East – were largely absent in Western-dominated feminist activism and scholarship on the WPS agenda, feminist foreign policy and NATO.[17] Since Russia launched its full-scale war, the EU, NATO and individual governments have provided military support to Ukraine. Ukrainian feminists have been vocal in their demands for arms deliveries to ensure their country’s survival, framing self-defence as a basic act of resistance.[18] Based on their real-life insecurities, they have exposed the need to decolonise feminist approaches to defence by establishing security guarantees and self-defence against military violence as fundamental feminist principles.[19] Ukrainian feminists have thus challenged some Western feminists who, from a position of privileged pacifism, continue to deny Ukraine agency and perpetuate Russian-centric narratives that reproduce the problematic dichotomy of the West/NATO vs Russia. Needless to say, an epistemic imperialism that relies on an abstract notion of pacifism exacerbates insecurities for the occupied societies, while also negating the role of women in the civilian liberation movement and the defence forces.[20]
But the war has also prompted feminist solidarity with Ukraine and more pragmatic positions on the use of military force, which recognise that in an existential war, self-defence and security guarantees are a precondition for emancipatory transformation and can be compatible with feminist foreign policy approaches. This is the case with the German branch of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), which recognises Ukraine’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter in a statement from 2023, or the German government’s feminist foreign policy (FFP).[21] Bénédicte Santoire shows, however, that in practice, German and other FFPs have been siloed to the soft issue of humanitarian aid and development policies and their position on defence in relation to Ukraine remained unclear in 2022.[22] Later analysis by Chiara Pierobon suggests that since the German FFP was only developed in Spring 2022, the war has shaped the very essence of the policy and its approach to military assistance to Ukraine.[23] These developments speak to the broader lack of feminist discussions on defence and deterrence beyond pacifist and anti-militarist approaches.[24]
A feminist perspective is sorely needed in discussions on a future security system to prevent wars, including security guarantees for Ukraine and feminist approaches to NATO’s defence and deterrence. It is time for a feminist re-thinking of deterrence beyond nuclear deterrence that focuses on both military and political deterrence through practices of societal resilience.[25] NATO’s deterrence and defence posture aims for whole-of-society approach to resilience, and the first step is to recognise how this approach is gendered. This would, for instance, mean focusing on concrete threats to women and disadvantaged groups, their physical and social well-being, and hybrid threats in the form of gendered disinformation spread by Russia.[27] Crisis preparedness through civilian-military cooperation also remains a very masculine sphere, which needs more participation by women and integration into the WPS agenda, following Finland’s example.[28] The Ukrainian example in particular holds important lessons for women’s active civilian and military resistance.[29] For example, Yuliya Yurchuk and Kateryna Zarembo speak of the myth of collective societal resilience, which makes female Ukrainians appear superhuman, where in reality resilience depends on a person’s individual economic, psychological, and social resources in the abnormal conditions of war.[30]
To conclude, self-defence and military support to Ukraine is a crucial yet less recognised aspect of feminist security and the WPS agenda. It involves combating an imperial aggressor and a repressive Russian regime that has waged a horrific war – including a war on gender – to subjugate Ukraine and dismantle the international order. The case of Ukraine also shows that feminist discussions on security and defence must consider what kind of security guarantees are needed to transform the historically unequal relations that made Ukraine vulnerable to Russia.
Decolonial Memory Work as a Response to In:Security in the Context of Russia’s War against Ukraine
Yuliya Yurchuk is Associate Professor of History of Ideas at Södertörn University, Stockholm. She specialises in memory studies, the history of religion, and the study of nationalism in Eastern Europe. She is the author of the book “Reordering of Meaningful Worlds: Memory of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Post-Soviet Ukraine” (Acta 2014). She also translates Swedish literature into Ukrainian and is an author of the book Sweden: a Model Kit (Vihola, 2022, in Ukrainian). Her research interests include memory, knowledge production, imperialism, decolonisation, and the securitisation of the past. > HomepageSince Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, decolonisation has been at the centre of public debate, where it has served as an explanatory model for the war and for the history of Ukraine and the other countries that were part of the Soviet Union. In Ukraine, discussions of decolonisation are taking place on two different levels: on the level of official politics and on the level of grassroots ‘personal’ decolonisation. At both levels, actors are questioning ‘inherited epistemologies’ (i.e. knowledge in terms of legacies of the past, inherited in the process of socialisation during the Soviet period and during the years of independence) and producing new self-narratives as a way of coping with existential anxieties in the face of insecurity. I argue that while decolonisation on the official level takes the form of nationalisation,[31] at grassroots level it is a means of liberation and helps people to adapt to the radical insecurity created by the war. Self-decolonising narratives contribute to transforming individual life stories in a way that does justice to the challenges of the present. Thus, ‘self-decolonisation’ is an empowering strategy that can strengthen (personal) resilience in response to insecurity.
Decommunisation and decolonisation: two discourses, one practice
When it comes to Ukraine’s efforts to deal with its past, the decade from 2014 to 2024 can roughly be divided into two periods: 1) the period from 2014 to 2021, which was dominated by the discourse of decommunisation;[32] and 2) the period from 2022 onwards, where the discourse of decolonisation prevailed. Both discursive tendencies were also reflected in the country’s legislation – the former in the ‘Law on decommunisation’ adopted in April 2015;[33] the latter in the ‘Law on condemnation and prohibition of propaganda of Russian imperial policy in Ukraine and decolonisation of place names’ introduced in 2023.[34] Nevertheless, both periods can be approached through the theoretical prism of decolonisation, understood as a project of liberation from the inherited epistemology of past regimes.
With Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and military assault in the east of the country, Ukrainian society faced a threat not only to its existential security but also to its epistemological security, which rests on trust in one’s knowledge about oneself. The Russian invasion, which was accompanied by propaganda campaigns that revolved around history and historical memory, undermined the knowledge that Ukrainians had about themselves.
This explains why the history of Russian oppression and Ukraine’s colonial status during the Soviet period, previously recognised only by intellectuals and a small part of Ukrainian society, has become central to public discussions of history since 2022. After the full-scale invasion, the re-evaluation of ‘inherited narratives’ intensified. More and more people started questioning the narrative of a ‘Ukrainian-Russian friendship’ and the presence of Russian cultural figures on Ukrainian territory. This is evidenced in surveys conducted before and after the invasion. For example, a survey conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiative Foundation in December 2022 found that about 59% of the Ukrainian population were in favour of renaming places named after Soviet and Russian . In 2020, only about 30% of Ukrainians supported such a renaming policy (see figure 1 below).
Figure 1:
Source: Fond Demokratychni Initiatyvy 2023, https://dif.org.ua/article/zasudzhennya-srsr-derusifikatsiya-maydan-yak-zminyuetsya-stavlennya-ukraintsiv-do-politiki-natsionalnoi-pamyati-na-tli-rosiyskoi-agresii
Figure 2
Source: Fond Demokratychni Initiatyvy 2020, https://dif.org.ua/article/shostiy-rik-dekomunizatsii-stavlennya-naselennya-do-zaboroni-simvoliv-totalitarnogo-minulogo
Such a re-evaluation of one’s knowledge about oneself is what the Peruvian sociologist and prominent theorist of decolonisation Anibal Quijano calls ‘epistemological reconstitution’.[35] The reconstituted decolonial identity thus comes with a new knowledge about oneself.
Epistemological reconstitution as a project of personal liberation
The most interesting instances of epistemological reconstitution are the personal decolonisation projects that have been mushrooming in the media space since 2022. Individuals have begun to share their own stories of liberation from colonial epistemologies. Importantly, even if they start with individual stories, they inscribe them in the bigger tapestry of collective identities in Ukraine. The projects are hosted on social media platforms, YouTube, and on Ukraine’s public service broadcaster Suspilne. But it should be emphasised that the topic of decolonisation first became popular thanks to projects not connected to the mainstream media. The podcasts created by Mariam Naiem and Valentyna Sotnykova are a good example. In 2023, they created the decolonisation podcast ‘De my?’ (‘Where are we?’). This podcast was part of the Svidomi platform – a community-driven initiative dedicated to distributing news and analytics on social media. A year later, Naiem and Sotnykova were invited to host their new project, a podcast called ‘Dekolonizatorky’ (literally: female decolonisers) on Suspilne. In this way, a private initiative born of genuine personal interest grew into a much bigger project supported by the public broadcaster. There are numerous examples of similar projects, and a detailed analysis of them would be an interesting endeavour in itself. Yet here I will focus on what they have in common.
The hosts of these projects invite guests who share their personal decolonisation stories and reflect on Ukrainian history and the re-evaluation of historical narratives. Moreover, both hosts and guests continually reflect on language, geopolitics and popular culture. In the process, they produce new narratives about themselves and Ukraine. The projects are an example of identity transformation under the dramatic circumstances of war. Decolonisation thus becomes a powerful tool for personal transformation and the integration of a difficult reality into new life narratives.
Photo 1: Mariam Naiem and Valentyna Sotnykova in their podcast ‘Dekolonizatorky’
Source: Podcast cover picture ‘Dekolonizatorky’ on Apple Podcasts, https://podcasts.apple.com/se/podcast/id1753039823
Decolonisation and the formation of new identities
Switching languages is a common thread that runs through many reconstituted narratives in the projects mentioned above. People often describe how they switched from Russian to Ukrainian in the process of forming a new identity in response to insecurity. There is also an emphasis on the ownership of history. ‘Inherited epistemologies’ (mainly from the Soviet period) are rejected and a new epistemology is constructed around previously forbidden episodes of history like the Holodomor of 1932–1933 and other instances of Stalinist terror. Last but not least, decolonisation is perceived as a precondition of Ukraine’s victory in the war. Here, a tendency towards the securitisation of (new) identities becomes apparent, where certain types of identity are framed as a prerequisite for security.
Liberated epistemologies can play a powerful role in transforming identities and overcoming colonial traumas. The reconstituted narratives individuals tell about themselves and the country as a whole help them to (re)envision the future without ‘inherited epistemologies’ that are increasingly perceived as oppressive. These narratives are also a tool of self-empowerment that help people cope with existential anxieties in the face of insecurity and the national identity at stake. Trauma expert Judith Herman stresses that transformed identities come about as a result of healing. In order to recover and imagine potential futures, it is essential that subjects (re)integrate different parts of the self, based on the self-knowledge that allows such re-integration.[37] The people involved in personal decolonisation projects mention dealing with feelings of shame, (self)-anger, and inferiority before they started caring about themselves from a position of love and understanding that the decolonisation framework provided. In the radical insecurity of war, people come to re-evaluate their attitudes to themselves and try to show themselves more love.
At the same time, it should be added that the decolonising agenda can be hijacked by partisan and state actors. This can potentially lead to the cementing of an official memory politics that excludes the histories of certain groups. For now, it is too early to see the consequences of administered or state-sponsored decolonisation policies. As this paper shows, the most interesting discussions on decolonisation touch upon questions of coming to terms with the past on a personal level. These discussions show how decolonisation can restore identities threatened by insecurities in the present.
Understanding the Environmental Consequences of the War in Ukraine
Oleksiy Vasyliuk is a Ukrainian environmentalist specialising in protected areas and biodiversity conservation. He graduated from Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv with a degree in Zoology. Since 2004, Oleksiy has served in the Animal Monitoring and Conservation programme at the Institute of Zoology (Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences). He participates actively in the National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, and Environment-People-Law. Since 2014, Oleksiy has led the Ukrainian Nature Conservation Group, an organisation of biologists. He has co-authored 20 articles and four books about the environmental impacts of Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Oleksiy helped to initiate the designation of more than 60 new protected areas in Ukraine. > Homepage
In three years of war, one-fifth of the territory of Ukraine (120,000 square kilometres) has been occupied. Most settlements across this territory have been completely destroyed. The entire occupied territory including active combat zones are currently mined, and according to international estimates, it could take up to 750 years to demine the area.
The war is not just a humanitarian catastrophe. Warfare leaves a significant footprint on the country’s ecosystems, natural resources and biodiversity. While the focus has primarily been on human casualties and damages to infrastructure, the consequences for the environment are no less severe and demand our . The war is changing not only infrastructure and cities, but also landscapes, flora and fauna, water resources and the air people breathe. Nature constantly provides humans with the resources they need to live, and by changing it, not only mankind’s own future, but also the existence of other species on the planet is jeopardised. Even now, it is important to study these impacts in detail in order to understand what nature will look like after the war and how scientists and ordinary people can help it to recover. After all, this factor is crucial to the sustainable development of Ukraine as a whole.
Destruction of nature through explosions and military equipment
During military combat, most changes happen on the surface. Explosions, artillery shelling, and the movement of heavy equipment leave traces on the landscape, destroying not only vegetation cover but also the soil structure and the wider ecosystem of the affected territories. Like a broken mechanism, natural processes come to a halt. Here it is worth considering not only the effects on areas at the epicentre of the fighting, but also secondary contamination of the soil, air and water in more far-removed regions. After an explosion, contaminated particles can travel long distances, sometimes even polluting the soil in other countries.[39]
Destroyed farmland, forests and parks and scorched earth are just some of the things warfare leaves in its wake. Damaged soil is no longer fertile and thus of no use for farming. It could take decades and in some cases even longer for these territories to recover.[40] It’s impossible to say how many generations of Ukrainians will have to wait before they can return to the damaged lands.
Forest fires: Another site of destruction
The forest fires that accompany military combat are another serious consequence for the environment (see map 1 below). They cause enormous damage to ecosystems, destroying flora and fauna as well as the natural resources that play an important role in maintaining the ecological balance.
Since it’s impossible to extinguish fires during the fighting and on mined territory, they continue for as long as the landscape allows, in other words until everything has burned down.
Fires resulting from shelling, explosions or destroyed military equipment destroy vast areas of forest that will take over a lifetime to regenerate. The war unfolded in Ukraine’s steppe zone, where forests are not typical. All the forests that existed here before the war were artificial plantations created to improve people’s lives in the harsh climatic conditions of the south. But these forests are gone now. At least 100,000 hectares of forest burned down around major cities alone.[41]
The destruction of these forests will have a long-term effect on the climate and the environment. Forests play an important role in regulating carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, conserving water resources and preventing soil erosion. Fires leave these ecosystems incapable of fulfilling these functions.
The Kinburn Spit — a national park in southern Ukraine destroyed as a result of warfare — is one of the most prominent ecological disasters in recent times. This unique natural amenity, rich in biodiversity, has gone up in flames, leaving behind a vast ecological void. The loss of these territories doesn’t just reduce biodiversity, but also disrupts natural cycles that cannot be quickly restored. Other national forest parks in eastern Ukraine, such as ‘Holy Mountains’ and ‘Kreminskie Forest’ have also been devastated by fires.[42]
The Kakhovka reservoir: Environmental impacts and restoration
Another ecological disaster caused by the war was the detonation of the Kakhovka hydroelectric dam by Russian troops on 6 June 2023. This led to a sharp drop in the level of water in the Kakhovka reservoir, posing a serious threat to the ecosystem of the reservoir and surrounding areas.
The destruction of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric dam is the largest ecological catastrophe of the war to date.[43] It radically changed the ecosystems that had developed around the reservoir. The changes were felt in three key areas: the former reservoir bed, flooded areas, and the north-western part of the Black Sea. In the dried areas of the seabed, bottom organisms disappeared and isolated water bodies were formed, which became traps for fish. The mass death of aquatic organisms caused secondary water pollution. In the flooding zone there was a massive loss of living organisms, including rare and internationally protected species. Protected natural areas were affected as a result. More than 80% of the flooded land was under national and international protection. The north-western part of the Black Sea was affected by eutrophication, the spread of blue-green algae and changes in salinity.
Despite the significant negative impact, the catastrophe also created the conditions for the spontaneous restoration of natural ecosystems, in particular, the renewal of the Dnieper flow over a 250-kilometre stretch. Populations of passable fish species are being restored and new spawning grounds are forming there. Native plants such as willows and poplars have begun to sprout in the drained areas, and floodplains are being restored with their characteristic biodiversity. The high climatic stability of the floodplain forests of Velikiy Lug corresponds to the natural state of the Dnieper River floodplain. It is possible to learn from the experience of nature restoration at the site of the Kakhovka reservoir when studying the consequences of similar events and planning the restoration of ecosystems.
A full assessment of the ecological consequences of this terrorist act is, however, impossible given the inaccessibility of the area and the absence of precise, verifiable qualitative data. Large-scale research can only take place after demining. In the meantime, some information may be lost due to natural ecosystem recovery. Looking ahead, it seems likely that researchers will be able to capture the extent of ecosystem restoration rather than the scale of the destruction that happened in 2023. The change in the status of rare species on the IUCN Red List as a result of the tragedy opens up new possibilities for calculating the damage. The analysis of soil samples and a refinement of impact assessments are also expected to play an important role in quantifying the damage, not least in monetary terms.
Any decision on the future of the territory of the former Kakhovka reservoir must be informed by an assessment of the consequences of the terrorist attack. The fact that it is contaminated by toxic substances rules out the possibility of agricultural use. And the natural regeneration of forest vegetation calls into question the feasibility of creating a new reservoir, as this would require the destruction of the largest forest area in Ukraine’s steppe zone.
Ukraine is faced with the challenge of developing scenarios for the post-war reconstruction of the southern region, including the question of whether to build a reservoir or find alternative solutions. Reconstruction tends to be seen mainly in terms of the revitalisation of infrastructure and economy. Yet quality of life in the region depends on healthy natural ecosystems: water resources, air quality, fertile soils, the climate and opportunities for recreation.
Is a spontaneous restoration of nature possible?
Nature has the capacity to restore itself, and after the war the recovery process will depend on many different factors. Restoring ecosystems, especially large and complex ones like reservoirs or forested areas, takes time and effort. Spontaneous regeneration on abandoned farmland and in destroyed settlements leads to the emergence of new, invasive species, and the presence of such alien plants and animals makes it more difficult to restore the ecological balance.
Map 1: Development of surface temperatures between 2021 and 2023
Source: Podcast cover picture ‘Dekolonizatorky’ on Apple Podcasts, https://podcasts.apple.com/se/podcast/id1753039823
The war in Ukraine is leaving deep scars on nature (such as changes in surface temperatures that impact the local ecosystems, see map 2 above). These scars will be felt not only in the near future, but for centuries to come. Once the active phase of fighting is over, there is a need to think seriously about restoring ecosystems and biodiversity. The Kakhovska reservoir is a prime example of how war can change nature and how important it is to act quickly to minimise these changes.
In this context, ecological factors are currently not only a question of security or insecurity in Ukraine, but a question of quality of life. Under martial law in Ukraine, however, almost all environmental restrictions and rules for the environmental assessment procedures have been lifted, which means that major recovery processes will be deferred until the post-war period.
Tetiana Skrypchenko is a sociologist who earned a Master’s degree in Sociology from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Since 2018 she has been an integral part of the Ukrainian research institution Sociological Rating Group, serving as a senior analyst, and currently holding the position of Deputy Director. Her expertise lies in both qualitative and quantitative research data analysis, having contributed to over 100 prominent national value research projects. During the war, she helped to conduct 25 monitoring waves of surveys in Ukraine and also led five research studies involving Ukrainians living abroad. In 2023, Tetiana joined ZOiS to engage in a research project focused on the subjects and processes of reconstruction and local development in the de-occupied regions of Ukraine. > HomepageResilience is a key element in Ukraine’s capacity to respond to insecurity. In the context of the ongoing war, resilience ensures the continuity of everyday life and supports collective morale and national and community-level recovery efforts. The most vulnerable groups in society – those facing compounded stressors such as poverty, age- and gender-based disparities, and direct exposure to the conflict – are also the least resilient. Understanding and addressing these vulnerabilities bolsters Ukrainian society against Russian aggression.
Levels of resilience and vulnerable groups
Resilience is crucial in wartime. Despite the sometimes dire security, energy, economic, and humanitarian situations in which they find themselves, Ukrainians have been remarkably resilient during the war. Studies such as Rating Lab’s monitoring surveys[44] demonstrate sustained high levels of both physical and psychological resilience.[45] This has been an important factor in sustaining a high level of civil activity, resource mobilisation, support for the military and social assistance and accelerating the restoration of housing and other infrastructure at the local level.
At the same time, levels of resilience vary across different groups. For example, resilience is lower among the less well-off population (see figure 1) and women. Low resilience in these groups can lead to more stress, long-term psychological problems, less social involvement, and higher risks to their financial well-being and health, thus compounding inequalities.
Figure 3:
Source: Rating Lab research, https://ratinglab.org/en/research/Dinamika_psihoemocijnih_staniv_naselennya
It is also important to understand that a certain level of resilience does not mean easy adaptation to wartime conditions. Apart from the aforementioned groups, other vulnerable categories of people include family members of defenders (especially their wives) and young people, who experience higher levels of stress. The problem of low resilience requires more attention and new initiatives, since a large segment of the population, including those who need support, do not use existing psychological services because of a stigma around seeking psychological help in Ukraine.[46]
A high level of resilience helps individuals and communities withstand crises, but social cohesion is just as important for determining the strength of collective responses over time. Indeed the two factors are interrelated, as a resilient society is more likely to sustain cohesion, but weak cohesion can make it harder to stay resilient (at the very least, based on the experience and observations of residents of de-occupied cities and towns in Ukraine, see footnote 50).
Dynamics of social cohesion and factors of division
Before the war, social cohesion in Ukraine was weakened by regional diversity, linguistic differences, and conflicting narratives on the direction the country should take. For example, before the war, there was no societal consensus on NATO membership or clear position vis-à-vis Russia. The war has changed that. It prompted a remarkable surge in cohesion, as Ukrainians were united by a shared sense of purpose and the existential threat posed by Russian aggression. Regional differences in social cohesion with ideological markers have largely diminished during the war. At the same time, factors of division, such as political polarisation and socio-economic disparities, have been exacerbated in certain contexts. For example, economic inequality has deepened as frontline regions experience greater devastation compared to relatively safe areas.
The dynamics of social resilience and cohesion have changed over the course of the war. The start of the war marked a peak of unity, mutual assistance, and support for the armed forces. Over time, however, the degree of societal unity has lessened. A study published by Rating Group at the end of 2023 showed that respondents believed Ukrainians were more united in 2022 (87%) than in 2023 (64%).[47]
Key factors in social division include:
– Staying or leaving Ukraine: Ukrainians who stayed after Russia’s full-scale invasion are ambivalent about those who left. They are generally warmer towards women with children but significantly colder towards other categories of refugees (see figure 4).[48]
– Participating or not participating in the war effort or avoiding mobilisation;
– Political differences, including positive/negative attitudes towards the government;
– A sense of injustice stemming from the uneven impact of war on different regions;
– Socio-economic inequalities – criticism of wealthier people who spend more on leisure pursuits, luxuries, and travel has become more pronounced during the war.
Figure 4: Attitude towards different social groups and categories
When developing social consolidation strategies, the government must address these divisions. In a survey conducted in 2023, respondents also identified political differences and mutual accusations as the top two factors that divide society (see figure 5).
Figure 5: Unifying and Dividing Factors
Paths to maintaining social resilience at national and local levels
In another 2023 survey, victories of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, reconstruction, and mutual assistance were seen by respondents as the most unifying factors for Ukrainians.[49] For others, economic growth, language, and successes in the EU accession process also helped to bind Ukrainian society.
Significant national events, such as military victories, boost collective morale and encourage people to volunteer and make donations. However, these moments are short-lived. Similarly, progress in the EU or NATO accession processes, although inspiring, is often halting and unpredictable. It is also beyond the control of national government and local communities. This is why stable national strategies are needed to build unity around what does not depend on European or other partners but lies solely within the responsibility of the Ukrainian government.
In the same study, family and loved ones were chosen by the majority of respondents as another critical factor, alongside faith in the Ukrainian armed forces, for maintaining personal resilience during the war. Routine activities were also significant, with one-third citing daily work as a key to staying . This explains why unemployed and retired people show lower resilience levels: Apart from lower income, they also have less daily communications and a reduced sense of purpose.
Building resilience within communities at the local level is vital, especially in de-occupied territories. In these areas, the difficulties of vulnerable groups are further compounded by the destruction wrought by occupation, tensions over (non-)investigation of collaboration, and other divisive issues related to the Russian occupation.
A survey of local community leaders identified several measures to enhance community cohesion which national authorities would do well to consider: [50]
– Engaging local residents in projects aimed at supporting Ukrainian defenders;
– Communication of unifying narratives by the authorities, for example in education initiatives and at commemorative events;
– Organising events, workshops, and other activities geared to bringing people with diverse perspectives together;
– Involving unity strategy development experts, NGOs, and volunteers familiar with the local context;
– Systematic approaches to national unity in all spheres at the state level, starting with public educational institutions;
– Reviving national customs and focusing on regional cultural heritage.
Early recovery efforts often relied on the collective spirit and unity of local residents, many of whom drew on their personal resources for reconstruction. While the future of this trend is uncertain, research on witnesses to occupation reveals that despite a lack of basic resources, many residents of de-occupied areas continue to show resilience and a desire to rebuild. Indeed, after occupation, there is often a surge in patriotic feeling and a strong motivation to rebuild the community. Different studies on rebuilding and reintegration in de-occupied regions show that the shared traumatic experience of occupation and surviving under shelling often brings communities together. Respondents noted an increased sense of national and regional identity, with many stating that they had become more ‘Ukrainian’ because of the war.
It is crucial to consider these experiences and establish institutions for remembering the wartime and occupation experience. Regional initiatives to address collective trauma should be scaled up to national level in order to foster unity and sustain resilience. Future reintegration efforts should also consider the gap between those who experienced occupation and rebuilding and those who did not, i.e. those who left during the occupation or were absent during the recovery process. National approaches must learn from community lessons and localised strategies.
There is a difference between national and local strategies in the process of recovery and resilience building. National policies provide overarching direction, set general priorities, allocate resources, and establish an institutional framework. Local communities work in a more direct and flexible way, reacting to urgent problems, using informal connections, and driving grassroots action. While national strategies (developed by central government) are often more structured, local initiatives (developed by local authorities) are often the first to act in a crisis, using their specific knowledge and resources to address challenges in real time. This difference highlights the need for a more systematic approach that integrates both levels, ensuring that national policies amplify and strengthen what works locally. Successful local efforts, like community rebuilding projects and support networks, could be scaled up by encouraging cooperation between local leaders, NGOs, and the government. Creating ways to share knowledge and give local innovators the support they need can help spread these solutions to other parts of Ukraine.
In sum, efforts to build resilience are not just about survival but also about resistance and empowerment. Resilience helps Ukraine stand up to Russian control, both on the frontline and in society. Community resilience, in particular, plays an important role in establishing emancipatory practices, fostering a sense of agency and security, and rejecting imposed narratives. By focusing on both national unity and local support, Ukraine can make sure that resilience works as a bulwark against outside threats and insecurity.
Conclusion
by Nadja Douglas
Today, three years into the war and with no immediate prospect for a just and sustainable peace in sight, the Ukrainian people have shown remarkable capacity to withstand, adapt and respond to the shocks, challenges and situations of insecurity that Russia’s war has presented them with. In the context of international negotiations or discussions, the calculated optimism and steadfastness of Ukrainian representatives leave observers baffled. Ukraine has become a symbol not only of resistance but also of the vast potential of emancipation. The national emancipation effort is made up of a myriad of human components, recalling what critical security scholars have always emphasised: The study of security and insecurity is ultimately about the experiences of ‘real people’ in ‘real places’.[51]
All the contributions in this report have stressed different facets or dimensions of security and insecurity as well as emancipatory paths to deal with the challenges presented by the war. An important takeaway from the workshop, now confirmed in the report, was that strategies for tackling these challenges differ markedly at the grassroots and the state/institutional level. Míla O’Sullivan, for example, observed that crisis preparedness and civilian defence in terms of a whole-of-society approach to resilience are gendered processes, performed in women’s active civilian and military resistance on the ground. She reveals many ambivalences regarding the inclusion of gender aspects in security thinking, decision-making and ultimately recovery, citing, for example, the gender-oblivious recovery plan imposed on Ukraine by the West. Indeed, as the author has shown earlier, even Ukraine’s own recovery plans have turned out to be blind to, for example, social reproduction. Here, they ignore the demands of Ukrainian feminists to prioritise social infrastructure, including schools, hospitals and nurseries.[52] Besides delineating the Ukrainian decolonial discourse as an identity-building endeavour and act of self-empowerment, Yuliya Yurchuk also points to the risk of the decolonising agenda being hijacked by partisan state actors, which she warns could potentially lead to a cementing of an official memory politics that excludes the histories of certain social groups. In the case of the environmental consequences of the war, it is mostly local actors who ultimately have to cope with the long-term impacts, document the damages and seek to mitigate them. Finally, Tetiana Skrypchenko’s study sheds light on the differences between national and local strategies in the process of recovery and resilience building: National policies provide direction, set priorities, allocate resources and create an institutional framework, whereas local communities work in a more direct and flexible way, reacting to urgent problems, relying on informal connections, and driving grassroots actions.
Aside from the interaction between local and institutional levels, there are other dimensions to the emancipatory responses to the diverse challenges of this war. The second is the aspect of social identity, be it women’s active resistance entailing a re-definition of gender roles or how Ukrainian citizens face down a threat not only to their existential but also to their epistemological security, which is based on trust in one’s knowledge about oneself. Then there is the surge of patriotism and social cohesion prompted by the war and the strong motivation that generates to rebuild the community. The third dimension is the recovery mind-set common to all emancipatory responses, which ultimately aim for a transformation from a state of insecurity to a state of security and self-awareness.
‘Security as emancipation’ and the human security agenda can serve as a prism only insofar as there is no need for further differentiation of the societal groups concerned. As Skrypchenko’s contribution shows, the most vulnerable groups often fall through the cracks when tales of resilience are supposed to show another picture.
In conclusion, this report seeks to illustrate that security in and around Ukraine is more multifaceted than realist discourses around deterrence and rearmament might suggest. It sheds light on the most pressing war-induced societal and environmental problems. It also tries to convey how under conditions of occupation local initiatives and state/institutional approaches complement and sometimes contradict each other. The report finally pleads for more recognition of the emancipatory paths various societal groups in Ukraine have embarked upon to withstand Russian occupation, ideological and material violence, and historical injustice.
References
[1] Krause and Williams 1996: 230 (Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, ‘Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,’ Mershon International Studies Review 40 (1996): 229-254.)
[2]Basu and Nunes 2013: 65. (Soumita Basu and João Nunes, ‘Security as emancipation,’ In: Critical Approaches to Security An introduction to theories and methods, edited by Laura Shepherd (Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2013.)
[3] Booth 1991: 319. (Kenneth Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, 17(4), 1991: 313-326.
[4] Fierke 2009: 16. (Karen Fierke, Critical Theory, Security and Emancipation. International Studies Association Compendium Project, 2009.)
[5] Cf. Basu and Nunes 2013: 68.
[6] Thomas 2004: 353, in: Fierke 2009: 12.
(Caroline Thomas, ‘What is Human Security? A Bridge between the interconnected challenges confronting the world,’ Security Dialogue 35(3), 2004: 353-354.
Karen Fierke, Critical Theory, Security and Emancipation. International Studies Association Compendium Project, 2009.)
[7] KonKoop explanation
[8] Basu 2013. (Soumita Basu, ‘Emancipatory Potential in Feminist Security Studies’, International Studies Perspectives 14, (2013): 455–458.)
[9] Hendl, Burlyuk, O’Sullivan, and Arystanbek 2024.
(Tereza Hendl, Olga Burlyuk, Míla O’Sullivan, and Aizada Arystanbek, ‘(En)Countering Epistemic Imperialism: A Critique of ‘Westsplaining’ and Coloniality in Dominant Debates on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 45:2, (2024): 171–209.)
[10] Kratochvíl and O’Sullivan 2023.
(Kratochvíl, Petr and Míla O’Sullivan, ‘A War Like No Other: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine as a War on Gender Order’, European Security, Vol. 32:3, (2023): 347-366.)
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Shmatko and Rachok 2024.
(Ivan Shmatko and Dafna Rachok, ‘Parallel Identities: LGBTQ+ Soldiers and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine’, in: Feminist Perspectives on Russia’s War on Ukraine: Hear Our Voices, edited by Maryna Shevtsova (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2024).)
[14] O’Sullivan 2024.
Míla O’Sullivan, ‘Women, Peace and Security as Deterrence? NATO and Russia’s War against Ukraine’, International Affairs, Vol. 100:2, (2024): 549–568.
[15] Kotliuk 2024.
(Galyna Kotliuk; ‚The Hidden Front of Russia’s War: Addressing Gender-Based Violence in Ukraine’,
Policy Brief, GPPI, 26 June 2024.
[16] Lomonosova and Provan 2024.
Nataliia Lomonosova and Anna Provan, Build Back Better for Everyone: A Feminist Perspective on Reconstruction and Recovery of Ukraine, Policy Paper, Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, 2024.
[17] O’Sullivan 2024; Krulišová and O’Sullivan 2022.
Kateřina Krulišová and Míla O’Sullivan, ‘Feminist Security Studies in Europe: Beyond Western Academics’ Club’, in: Feminist IR in Europe: Knowledge Production in Academic Institutions, edited by Maria Stern and Ann Towns (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).
[18] Feminist Initiative Group 7 July 2022.
Feminist Initiative Group, ‘The Right to Resist: A Feminist Manifesto’, 7 July 2022, Commons/Spilne: https://commons.com.ua/en/right-resist-feminist-manifesto/.
[19] Ibid.
[20] For a detailed analysis, see Hendl et al. 2024: 19.
[21] Dinkel, Schirwon and Stamm July 2022.
Serafine Dinkel, Dana Schirwon and Leonie Stamm, Defining Feminist Foreign Policy in Germany’s National Security Strategy, DGAP Policy Brief, July 2022: https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/defining-feminist-foreign-policy-germanys-national-security-strategy.
[22] Santoire 2024.
Bénédicte Santoire, ‘Loud and Uncomfortable Silences: Ukraine and the Challenges, Limits, and Possibilities of Western Feminist Foreign Policies’, in: Feminist Perspectives on Russia’s War on Ukraine: Hear Our Voices, edited by Maryna Shevtsova (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2024).
[23] Pierobon 2024.
Chiara Pierobon, ‘Shaping German Feminist Foreign Policy in Times of Conflict in Ukraine’, in: Polarization, Shifting Borders and Liquid Governance, edited by Anja Mihr and Chiara Pierobon (Springer, 2024): https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-44584-2_17.
[24] O’Sullivan 2024.
[25] O’Sullivan 2024.
[26] NATO considers resilience to be the first line of deterrence, as it is an important aspect of deterrence by denial. See https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/topics_133127.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[27] O’Sullivan 2024.
[28] See Finland’s WPS NAP 2023–2027: https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/165144.
[29] O’Sullivan 2024.
[30] Yurchuk and Zarembo 2024.
Yuliya Yurchuk and Kateryna Zarembo, ‘The Human Face of Ukrainian Resilience’, in: A World Order
in Transformation?, edited by Ninna Mörner (Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University, 2024).
[31] Nationalisation of historical and mnemonic narratives usually means presentation of history as a nation- building process, in the Ukrainian case closely linked to the process of state-building.
[32] Decommunisation describes the process of eliminating former communist elements, officials and symbols from public life.
[33] This was a package of four different laws commemorating the victory over Nazism in the Second World War, condemning the communist and National-Socialist totalitarian regimes, remembering the fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the twentieth century, and on granting access to the archives of repressive institutions under the communist totalitarian regime.
[34] See text of the law (latest edition 03 May 2023).
[35] Quijano 2007.
Anibal Quijano, ‘Coloniality and modernity/Rationality’, Cultural Studies, 21:2-3 (2007), 168–178.
[36] See, for instance, the episode on Holodomor with Daria Mattigly, a recognised expert on the period: https://podcasts.apple.com/se/podcast/decolonisation/id1771071510?i=1000680725670.
[37] Herman 2023.
Judith Herman, Truth and Repair: How Trauma Survivors Envision Justice. Basic Books, 2023.
[38] Vasyliuk, 18 November 2024.
Oleksiy Vasyliuk, Danger! Mines! The terrible environmental and human cost of Ukraine’s minefields, Ukraine War Environmental Consequences Work Group, 18 November 2024, https://uwecworkgroup.info/danger-mines-the-terrible-environmental-and-human-cost-of-ukraines-minefields/#:~:text=Some%20consequences%20may%20only%20become%20apparent%20over,every%20day%20of%20the%20war%20so%20far.
[39] Solokha et al. 2024.
Maksym Solokha et al. ‘Soil Degradation and Contamination Due to Armed Conflict in Ukraine’, Land 13, no. 10 (2024): 1614. https://doi.org/10.3390/land13101614.
[40]Tsymbalyuk 2025.
Darya Tsymbalyuk, Ecocide in Ukraine: The Environmental Cost of Russia’s War. John Wiley & Sons, 2025.
[41] Vasyliuk and Parchomenko 2024.
Oleksiy Vasyliuk and Viktor Parchomenko, Flames of war: How Ukraine lost over 1,000 square kilometers of forest, 2024 UWEC work group, Issue 21, December 2024.
[42] Ukraine Crisis Media Center 2022.
Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Unique plants in the south of Ukraine may become extinct because of the war, 23 December 2022, https://uacrisis.org/en/cherez-vijnu-unikalni-roslyny-na-pivdni-ukrayiny-mozhut-znyknuty-nazavzhdy.
[43] IWM Vienna 2025.
Institute for Human Sciences (IWM Vienna), Documenting Environmental Changes Caused by the Destruction of the Kakhovka Reservoir, Blog ‘Documenting Ukraine’, 31 January 2025, https://www.iwm.at/documenting-ukraine/blog/environmental-changes-kakhovka-reservoir.
[44] Rating Lab research, December 2023.
Rating Lab research, Dynamics of Psycho-emotional States of the Population, December 2023, https://ratinglab.org/en/research/Dinamika_psihoemocijnih_staniv_naselennya.
[45] The Resilience Index scale contains 11 dimensions and consists of 2 indicators: psychological resilience includes such measures as interest in life, ability to make decisions, attitude to the past and future, sense of self-worth etc., while physical resilience takes into account maintaining physical health, quality of sleep, nutrition, feeling of fatigue, etc.
[46] Rating Lab and AUK research September 2024.
Rating Lab and AUK research, Barriers and Stereotypes: Why People Avoid Psychological Help, September 2024, https://ratinglab.org/en/research/baryeri-ta-stereotipi-chomu-lyudi-unikayut-psihologichnoyi-dopomogi
[47] Rating Group research, December 2023.
Rating Group research, 25th wave of the national survey ‘Ukraine Under Conditions of War’, December 2023, http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/dvadcyat_piyate_zagalnonacionalne_opituvanny_spriynyattazagroz_na_zimu_2023-2024.html.
[48] Rating Group research, August 2023.
Rating Group research, Sociological Research for Independence Day: Perception of Patriotism and the Future of Ukraine, August 2023, http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/soc_olog_chne_dosl_dzhennya_do_dnya_nezalezhno_uyavlennya_pro_patr_otizm_ta_maybutn_ukra_ni_16-20_se.html.
[49] Rating Group research, June 2023.
Rating Group research, Ukraine’s Resilience Formula: The Essential Components During War and Post-War, June 2023, http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/ukraine_s_resilience_formula_the_essential_components_during_war_and_post-war_6_11_june_2023.html
[50] Rating Group and TDC research, June 2024.
Rating Group and TDC research, Promoting Unity: Recommendations for the Development of a National Reintegration Strategy Based on the Experience of the Kharkiv and Kherson Regions, June 2024, https://tdcenter.org/2024/07/02/promoting-unity-recommendations-for-the-development-of-a-national-reintegration-strategy-based-on-the-experience-of-the-kharkiv-and-kherson-regions/
[51] Basu and Nunes 2013: 75.
[52] Feminist Initiative Group 2022, quoted in Kratochvil and O’Sullivan 2022: 360.
Additional acknowledgments
Anne Boden (language editor) is the english-language publications editor at ZOiS. She studied Russian and German in Dublin and Cambridge and holds a PhD in German Studies from Trinity College Dublin.
Iaroslav Boretskii (designer) is the infographic designer and cartographer in the KonKoop project, based at ZOiS. As a fellow scholar on the Erasmus Mundus Cartography M.Sc.,he studied Cartography, Geoinformatics and Graphic Design at Technical University Munich (TUM), Technische Universität Wien (TUW), Technische Universität Dresden (TUD), and the University of Twente (ITC Department).
Kerstin Bischl (editor) has been the academic coordinator of the KonKoop research network at ZOiS since April 2022. She brings a cultural and global history perspective to her work. Her PhD at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin was on gender relations and the dynamics of violence in the everyday life of Red Army soldiers from 1941 to 1945.